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ABSTRACT 
American foundations and other philanthropic giving entities hold 
about $1 trillion in investment assets, and that figure continues to grow 
every year. Even as urgent contemporary needs go unmet, philanthropic 
organizations spend only a tiny fraction of their wealth each year, mostly 
due to restrictive terms in contracts between donors and firms limiting the 
rate at which donations can be distributed. Law has played a critical role 
in underwriting and encouraging this buildup of philanthropic wealth. For 
instance, contributors can typically take a full tax deduction for the value 
of their contributions today, no matter when the foundation spends their 
money, and pay no tax on the investment earnings the organization reaps 
in the meantime.  
What, if anything, justifies public support for “restricted spending” 
charity? This Article offers the first comprehensive assessment of that 
question and supplies original empirical evidence on several key aspects 
of it. I argue that restricted spending sacrifices crucial information, leaves 
superior opportunities on the table, and on average transfers funds to 
times when they are less useful. While there is a place for large and long-
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lived philanthropic organizations in American society, that role does not 
require public support for restricted spending. As long as foundations can 
demonstrate their value to new donors, they will continue to thrive. I set 
out a series of policy recommendations aimed at better reconciling 
nonprofit law and the principles that justify it.  
I support my claims with new evidence drawn from a data set of over 
200,000 firm-year observations of private foundations. For example, I find 
that foundations earn about twice as much money per year as in earlier 
studies funded by foundation-industry lobbyists and that they are growing 
three times faster than those earlier studies suggested. This finding implies 
that the law could require a much higher annual “payout” from 
foundations. I also find that new laws introduced in about a dozen states 
since 2006 have significantly slowed foundation spending in the enacting 
states. Last, I offer simulations of several policy proposals for making 
foundations more effective at fighting recessions.  
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INTRODUCTION 
If the US philanthropic sector were the output of a nation, it would rank 
as the product of the world’s sixteenth-largest economy, just behind 
Mexico, and ahead of Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Sweden.
1
 Philanthropic 
institutions on this scale are uniquely American.
2
 Other wealthy nations, 
such as Great Britain and Germany, have recently begun to develop 
modest philanthropic sectors, but nothing to rival ours.
3
 Some of this 
phenomenon is cultural, an outgrowth of the ideals of the decentralized 
American state.
4
 Much of it, though, likely owes its success to legal rules 
that have encouraged the accumulation of philanthropic wealth, including 
a set of generous federal and state tax subsidies.
5
 In a modern era where 
wealth and power are growing ever more concentrated, what justifies this 
use of public funds to underwrite private, if charitable, wealth?   
The growth of philanthropic wealth depends on law’s willingness to 
embrace what I will call a policy of restricted spending. At many 
charitable organizations, managers are free to spend most or all of the 
firm’s revenues on current needs, whether they be housing the indigent or 
curing deadly diseases. Foundations, in contrast, almost uniformly are 
governed by agreements that prohibit managers from spending more than 
 
 
 1. See GDP Ranking, THE WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/GDP-ranking-
table (last updated Apr. 11, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/78YB-ZSZ4. If we only compared 
changes in US philanthropic wealth to world GDPs, US philanthropy would rank around sixtieth, 
behind New Zealand but ahead of Hungary. Id. 
 2. Helmut K. Anheier & Stefan Toepler, Philanthropic Foundations: An International 
Perspective, in PRIVATE FUNDS, PUBLIC PURPOSE: PHILANTHROPIC FOUNDATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE 3, 8 (Helmut K. Anheier & Stefan Toepler eds., 1999). 
 3. Id. at 3–5. 
 4. DAVID C. HAMMACK & HELMUT K. ANHEIER, A VERSATILE AMERICAN INSTITUTION: THE 
CHANGING IDEALS AND REALITIES OF PHILANTHROPIC FOUNDATIONS 19–42 (2013). 
 5. See OLIVIER ZUNZ, PHILANTHROPY IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 11–17 (2012). 
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a small portion of the value of a given donor’s gift in any given year.6 By 
holding spending down below the annual investment earnings and other 
income of the foundation, the restricted-spending rules permit the 
organization to grow ever larger.   
Law assists the project of restricted spending in a variety of ways.
7
 The 
federal government, and most states, award generous tax incentives for 
making donations to charity. Those incentives do not depend at all on 
when the charity spends the donated funds; the government offers the 
same reward at the time of donation whether the charitable acts actually 
occur the same year or centuries in the future. Because donors can usually 
invest their tax savings for a profit over time, this structure provides a 
powerful incentive to donate first and spend later. In some ways, as I’ll 
detail, the tax rewards for giving are even higher for gifts to organizations 
that restrict their spending. Further, state organizational law imposes a 
duty on managers to safeguard the wishes of donors who want to see their 
money last in “perpetuity”; and, in more than a dozen states, the law 
actually presumes that managers have failed that duty simply by spending 
more than seven percent or so of their organization’s assets in any year.  
The result is that nearly a trillion dollars of philanthropic wealth now 
sits on the sidelines, held in abeyance not just for tomorrow, but for the 
indefinite future.
8
 Taxes paid by current taxpayers have bolstered these 
funds in considerable measure.
9
 Yet the benefits, if they ever arrive, will 
be enjoyed mostly by future generations.  
Surprisingly, there has been little serious scholarly attention to law’s 
role in restricted spending and the buildup of the philanthropic sector. A 
handful of think-tank white papers and public policy journal articles have 
batted around some basic ideas, such as whether we should care about 
whether public funds pay for charity now or later.
10
 The closest to a 
 
 
 6. See LOREN RENZ & DAVID WOLCHECK, FOUND. CTR., PERPETUITY OR LIMITED LIFESPAN: 
HOW DO FAMILY FOUNDATIONS DECIDE? 4 (2009), available at http://foundationcenter.org/ 
gainknowledge/research/pdf/perpetuity2009.pdf. 
 7. For detail on the points in this paragraph, see infra Part I. 
 8. See Aggregate Fiscal Data of Foundations in the U.S., 2012, FOUND. CTR., 
http://data.foundationcenter.org/#/foundations/all/nationwide/total/list/2012 (last visited Apr. 19, 
2016), archived at https://perma.cc/AP7R-DHPE.  
 9. See Michelle H. Yetman & Robert J. Yetman, How Does the Incentive Effect of the 
Charitable Deduction Vary Across Charities?, 88 ACCT. REV. 1069, 1071 (2012) (reporting that 
private foundation donors are highly sensitive to tax incentives). 
 10. Bill Bradley et al., The Nonprofit Sector’s $100 Billion Opportunity, HARV. BUS. REV., May 
2003, at 3, 3–11; Renée A. Irvin, Endowments: Stable Largesse or Distortion of the Polity?, 67 PUB. 
ADMIN. REV. 445, 445 (2007); Akash Deep & Peter Frumkin, The Foundation Payout Puzzle 1–31 
(Hauser Ctr. for Nonprofit Orgs., Working Paper No. 9, 2001), available at https://www.hks.harvard. 
edu/content/download/68878/1248322/version/1/file/workingpaper_9.pdf. Some foundation leaders 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss5/5
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complete exploration is an eight-page monograph from Stanford Professor 
Michael Klausner.
11
 There has been no systematic examination of the 
arguments for and against government support for restricted-spending 
foundations and little effort to link the policy arguments to concrete legal 
rules. This gap in theorizing has also produced a gap in empirical data: 
because few people have been formulating the questions, we have not had 
much research to tell us the answers.  
This Article attempts to begin all these tasks. I critically examine prior 
justifications for restricted spending and offer some new possibilities for 
consideration. I show that in some cases theory doesn’t take us all the way 
to a conclusion and that we need more facts about how donors and 
foundation managers actually behave. I attempt to fill in some of those 
facts with original empirical data. And I then connect these tentative 
findings with some basic principles for reforming the current 
underpinnings of the law of restricted spending. 
To preview the analysis in a bit more detail, I first examine the social 
costs of restricted-spending rules. As others have acknowledged, setting 
aside funds for the future reduces the efficacy of the resulting spending by 
worsening the fit between society’s needs and the donor’s goals, and 
heightens the cost of separating the uses of the money from the owner’s 
control.
12
 I add that waiting imposes other kinds of costs on governments, 
beneficiaries, and the foundations themselves. Waiting sacrifices the 
opportunity to learn from and build on charitable successes and failures, 
and to invest in social programs with long-term rewards. It also shifts 
money from a time when resources are relatively scarce (now) to a period 
 
 
have weighed in, usually on the side of perpetual foundations. E.g., PAUL BREST & HAL HARVEY, 
MONEY WELL SPENT: A STRATEGIC PLAN FOR SMART PHILANTHROPY 259–66 (2008); JOEL L. 
FLEISHMAN, THE FOUNDATION: A GREAT AMERICAN SECRET 236–48 (2007); Carl J. Schramm, Law 
Outside the Market: The Social Utility of the Private Foundation, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 355, 
398–407 (2006). Evelyn Brody also has provided a fine overview of the history of the endowment 
debate. Evelyn Brody, Charitable Endowments and the Democratization of Dynasty, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 
873, 899–944 (1997).  
 There have been notable articles analyzing the related question of wealth accumulation by 
operating charities, such as universities and hospitals. See, e.g., Daniel Halperin, Tax Policy and 
Endowments: Is Excessive Accumulation Subsidized?, 67 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 17 (2011); Henry 
Hansmann, Why Do Universities Have Endowments?, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 3, 14–39 (1990); Sarah E. 
Waldeck, The Coming Showdown over University Endowments: Enlisting the Donors, 77 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1795 (2009). As we will see, that question has some overlap with foundation spending, but also 
many points of departure. See Waldeck, supra, at 1814 (“[Private-foundation] rule[s] . . . reflect[] 
policy concerns that are largely absent in the university context.”). 
 11. Michael Klausner, When Time Isn’t Money: Foundation Payouts and the Time Value of 
Money, 1 STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV. 51, 51–59 (2003). 
 12. See Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, The Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 50 UCLA L. REV. 
1303, 1327–39 (2003). 
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(the future) when, as I demonstrate with some new evidence, foundations 
will be flush with cash.   
On the other side, I argue that while there are strong arguments for 
encouraging savings by charities, these arguments mostly don’t support 
current restricted-spending rules. For example, it is true that foundations 
can develop expertise in their chosen policy areas and can serve as 
laboratories and incubators for new ideas.
13
 But preserving these 
incubators doesn’t demand restricted spending, as long as managers are 
willing to seek out new funding—as indeed most commentators believe 
they should. I also suggest that charity can usefully save to prepare for 
times of future great need—but this implies that the organization should 
also be free to spend profligately when the need arrives.  
These analyses supply some basic principles for reforming current law. 
While I leave development of exact details to await later work and better 
data, I argue that at a minimum federal law should require many 
foundations to pay out a considerably larger share of their assets each year 
than it now does. Congress also should close the loopholes presented by 
lightly regulated alternatives to the foundation form, especially those 
offered by the so-called donor-advised funds. At the same time, good 
policy might additionally include rewards or other positive incentives, 
especially incentives for foundations to spend or loan out money during 
recessions. State tax law could mirror these changes, and states should 
likely abandon the current movement to impose a legal cap on annual 
foundation spending.  
At each stage of the analysis I supplement my argument with original 
empirical data. Drawing on a database spanning twenty-five years and 
thousands of foundations, I am able to offer at least preliminary evidence 
on several key questions underlying the restricted-spending debate. I find, 
for example, that foundation investments grow at about double the rate 
claimed in earlier work funded by the foundation industry. I also find that, 
including new contributions, foundation wealth is growing at more than 
triple the rate advocates of restricted spending have suggested. The data 
suggest that state laws setting a defeasible cap on spending in fact have 
diminished spending. And I am able to run simulations to compare several 
different policies for curing the problem of pro-cyclical foundation 
spending. While these findings are hardly the last word on foundation 
spending, they helpfully fill in holes in our current understanding. 
 
 
 13. See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss5/5
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Part I of the Article lays out more detailed background on philanthropy 
and the laws that subsidize it. In Part II, I consider Professor Klausner’s 
arguments that the concept of the time value of money should not apply to 
foundations and show several significant gaps in his claims. Part III delves 
into the social costs of restricted spending, while Part IV reviews old and 
new arguments in its favor. Part V synthesizes the two into a set of policy 
implications. The Appendix sets out technical details of the empirical 
analysis appearing throughout.  
I. BACKGROUND 
Let’s begin by clearing up some terminology. A foundation, in the 
ordinary use of that word, is a charitable institution that exists to give 
away money, usually to other charities. The tax code’s definition doesn’t 
quite line up with general English usage. In tax lingo, a “private 
foundation” is an organization that draws revenue from just a few 
sources.
14
 In contrast, a “public charity” is generally one that derives 
support from a relatively broad cross-section of the public.
15
 Private 
foundations are subject to rules and regulations, and even a small tax, from 
which public charities are exempted.
16
   
Thus, some entities that the general public would think of as 
“foundations” are not foundations for tax purposes. A common example 
are the so-called “community foundations,” which collect small donations 
from the public and spend them in a concentrated geographic area.
17
 Other 
entities that the tax code treats as “private foundations” may distribute few 
funds, and instead focus on direct charitable service; the code calls these 
private “operating foundation[s].”18 For simplicity, in this Article I use the 
term “foundation” to refer generically to grant-making institutions, 
whether they are treated as private foundations by the tax code or not. 
A major recent alternative to the foundation form is the donor-advised 
fund, or “DAF.” A DAF is just an account, managed by a “sponsoring” 
 
 
 14. See ROBERT J. DESIDERIO, PLANNING TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS § 16.03 (LexisNexis 
Matthew Bender 2016). 
 15. See id. § 17.08. 
 16. George Johnson & David Jones, K. Community Foundations, in INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 
EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION (CPE) TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION 
PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR 1994 (1994), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/ 
eotopick94.pdf. 
 17. For a helpful overview, see Tanya D. Marsh, A Dubious Distinction: Rethinking Tax 
Treatment of Private Foundations and Public Charities, 22 VA. TAX REV. 137, 141–42 (2002). 
 18. I.R.C. § 4942(j)(3) (2014). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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nonprofit, holding assets contributed by a donor.
19
 The donor retains the 
right to “advise” the nonprofit on how to spend the money. Once placed in 
the account, the donated funds can be used only to support the sponsor or 
other charities.
20
 Since sponsors know they won’t receive new 
contributions if they ignore their donors’ “advice,” as a practical matter, 
the donor remains in control of the funds.
21
 Nonetheless, the donor can 
claim a full deduction at the time the money is placed in the account.
22
 
Often, the sponsor will qualify as a “public charity,” since by sponsoring 
many accounts it can claim that its revenues derive from a broad cross-
section of the community.
23
 From the donor’s perspective, though, the 
DAF works much like a mini foundation, albeit not subject to the extra 
rules that usually go with the foundation form.  
The vast majority of foundations follow a policy of what I will call 
“restricted spending.”24 Through the firm’s organizational documents and 
governing state law, the foundation’s managers are constrained to spend 
only a small fraction of the available assets each year. Sometimes this 
constraint will be phrased as a percentage of the value of the firm’s assets, 
while in other instances it will be a more general instruction to pursue a 
strategy that will preserve the organization’s assets “in perpetuity.”25   
As other scholars have demonstrated, the law is not simply neutral 
towards restricted spending and the goal of perpetuity, but rather actively 
supports them.
26
 The charitable contribution deduction is the first, and 
probably largest, support. The federal government and most states allow 
taxpayers to reduce their taxable income by the amount of any donation to 
an eligible charity.
27
 Similarly, decedents’ estates can deduct the amount 
of any money left to charity from the amount subject to federal tax.
28
 In 
effect, the deduction is a matching grant for the production of charitable 
goods.
29
   
 
 
 19. Id. § 170(f)(18). 
 20. HOWARD HUSOCK, MANHATTAN INST., GROWING GIVING: AMERICAN PHILANTHROPY AND 
THE POTENTIAL OF DONOR-ADVISED FUNDS 2 (2015), available at https://www.manhattan-institute.o 
rg/sites/default/files/cr_97.pdf. 
 21. See Marsh, supra note 17, at 170–71. 
 22. HUSOCK, supra note 20, at 2. 
 23. See Marsh, supra note 17, at 147. 
 24. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 25. Susan N. Gary, Charities, Endowments, and Donor Intent: The Uniform Prudent 
Management of Institutional Funds Act, 41 GA. L. REV. 1277, 1282–83, 1305–06 (2007). 
 26. See, e.g., Daniel Halperin, Is Income Tax Exemption for Charities a Subsidy?, 64 TAX L. 
REV. 283, 306–07 (2011); Hansmann, supra note 10, at 20; Irvin, supra note 10, at 454. 
 27. I.R.C. § 170(a)(1) (2014). 
 28. Id. § 2055. 
 29. Brian Galle, Charities in Politics: A Reappraisal, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1561, 1568 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss5/5
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Allowing foundation donors to claim their deduction at the time of 
contribution creates powerful incentives to give far in advance of when the 
donor wants the money spent.
30
 By accelerating her donation, the donor 
can get the benefit of the government’s subsidy sooner and invest that 
money in the interim. This allows her to spend more in the future, or, 
alternatively, to obtain the same future spending amount with a smaller 
out-of-pocket outlay.  
Commentators disagree about whether these incentives are costly to the 
government. Michael Klausner argues that in many circumstances delayed 
spending does not cost the government anything.
31
 Assuming that the 
foundation’s assets are invested as profitably as the government’s money 
would have been, the delay does not reduce the present value of the 
government’s subsidy.32   
An immediate deduction also makes restricted spending appealing if 
the donor can make partial use of her money in the interim. For example, 
commentators note that control of a foundation and its resources gives the 
donor prestige, power, and influence.
33
 In the case of entrepreneurs who 
donate corporate stock, the private foundation’s founders and their heirs 
can sit on its board and direct how the shares it holds are voted, 
maintaining de facto control of the firm whose ownership they have in 
form surrendered.
34
 To the extent that donating money directly to an 
operating charity would not bring these same rewards, establishing a 
foundation looks relatively more attractive.  
 
 
(2013); Saul Levmore, Taxes as Ballots, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 387, 405 (1998). 
 30. Daniel Halperin, Tax Policy and Endowments: Is Excessive Accumulation Subsidized? (Part 
II), 67 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 125 (2011); Hansmann, supra note 10, at 20; Irvin, supra note 10, at 
447; Ray D. Madoff, What Leona Helmsley Can Teach Us About the Charitable Deduction, 85 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 957, 968 (2010). For a formal mathematical analysis, see Carolyn B. Levine & Richard 
C. Sansing, The Private Foundation Minimum Distribution Requirement and Public Policy, 36 J. AM. 
TAX’N ASS’N 165, 167, 169–70 (2014). 
 31. Klausner, supra note 11, at 54. But see Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Philanthropy’s 
New Agenda: Creating Value, HARV. BUS. REV., Nov.–Dec. 1999, at 121, 121–22. 
 32. Klausner, supra note 11, at 54. 
 33. Levine & Sansing, supra note 30, at 169. This can be true of the estate tax deduction, as well. 
For instance, suppose that Leona calculates that her heirs will want to give some money to charity 
during their lifetimes. If she sets aside some money from her estate into a family foundation, she can 
give her heirs three benefits: money to spend on charity, the power and prestige of the foundation, and 
relief from the estate tax. If she simply left them the money, they would get only the cash left after the 
estate tax’s bite.  
 34. See I.R.C. § 4943(c)(2) (2014). Private foundations can’t hold more than twenty percent of a 
business, id., but this is a large enough block of a publicly traded firm to give effective control in many 
instances. And firms can exceed the cap for as long as ten years after the gift. Id. § 4943(c)(6)–(7). 
Even more flexibility is possible by using contingent voting rights or by setting voting thresholds for 
certain key corporate actions in a way that gives the foundation an effective veto. Treas. Reg. 
§ 53.4943-3 (2015). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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A less-familiar aspect of the rule allowing full deductibility for 
restricted-spending gifts is that it facilitates tax planning. Donors can 
contribute at the moment that the deduction will generate maximum 
value—usually when their tax rate is highest or the value of the assets they 
are contributing is at its peak—again without having to trade off that goal 
against their preference for when to fund charitable projects.
35
   
Thus, a common piece of tax advice given to entrepreneurs whose 
firms are about to go public is that they should contribute a portion of their 
stock to a new foundation or DAF.
36
 Assuming that the entrepreneur was 
planning to donate someday, donating at the moment of the IPO 
accelerates the deduction during a year when the entrepreneur’s tax rate is 
as high as it will ever be. It also allows the entrepreneur to claim the value 
of the donated stock as a deduction at a time when that value, too, may be 
at its peak.
37
 Government loses not only because of the timing and the rate 
shift, but also because the value of the stock at the time it’s ultimately sold 
for charitable purposes may be less than the value of the deduction the 
donor claimed.  
As Dan Halperin has shown, another major tax subsidy for restricted 
spending is the exclusion of foundation investment earnings from the 
corporate income tax.
38
 By contributing their investment assets to a 
foundation earlier than they want the funds spent, donors can allow those 
investments to grow tax-free. In contrast, if they held the investments 
themselves, they would often have to pay tax on any appreciation.  
Professor Halperin acknowledges the counterargument that other tax 
rules might allow for effectively the same treatment,
39
 but this may be an 
unnecessary concession. Donors who contribute publicly traded stock to a 
foundation can deduct the full value of the gift without paying tax on their 
built-in gains, seemingly achieving the same end result as early 
contribution.
40
 To avoid all tax on her donated assets, though, the donor 
must never exchange them, from the day she acquires them until the day 
they are donated. This lock-in is itself economically costly, since it 
 
 
 35. See Marsh, supra note 17, at 171 (noting that DAFs allow donors to claim deductions in 
high-income years). 
 36. E.g., Ryan Boland, The First (and Often Forgotten) Rule of Impactful Giving: Give the Right 
Asset, PRAC. TAX STRATEGIES, Oct. 2014, at 148, 152–53. DAFs have the advantage that they allow a 
full market value deduction for the founder’s stock, even if not publicly traded. See id. at 152. 
 37. See David Yermack, Deductio’ ad absurdum: CEOs Donating Their Own Stock to Their Own 
Family Foundations, 94 J. FIN. ECON. 107, 110–11 (2009) (reporting that stock donated to foundations 
tends to decline in value after donation). 
 38. Halperin, supra note 26, at 288, 302, 305. 
 39. See id. at 308. 
 40. See Brody, supra note 10, at 944.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss5/5
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prevents the donor from switching away from underperforming 
investments.
41
 At the margin, we would expect donors to accept a lock-in 
cost of just a hair short of the full amount of the tax saved.
42
 So the ability 
to contribute built-in-gain securities with no tax is less valuable than it 
appears at first glance.  
Finally, in addition to tax law, other legal rules help to underwrite 
restricted spending. The state law of nonprofit organizations obliges 
managers to obey the wishes of a donor who chooses to limit the uses of 
her money.
43
 Charitable trusts are exempt from the rule against 
perpetuities.
44
 Other rules set a default that managers must operate a 
foundation with the goal of preserving its resources in perpetuity.
45
 As 
with the laws of contract and business corporations, the existence of a 
judicial apparatus for enforcing these guidelines is itself a modest 
subsidy.
46
 More significantly, and unlike an ordinary business corporation, 
state attorneys general are charged with enforcing managers’ adherence to 
nonprofit law.
47
 Few do so with much vigor,
48
 but donors can and often do 
choose to incorporate in states, such as New York and California, with the 
most active attorney general offices.
49
   
In sum, the law not only tolerates restricted spending, but also actively 
encourages donations to restricted-spending organizations. My goal for the 
remainder of this Article will be to try to understand what, if anything, can 
justify that choice. 
II. THE TIME VALUE OF CHARITY: A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 
Restricted-spending policies defer charitable good deeds into the 
future. How should policy makers compare charity now against the benefit 
of charity later? One standard tool in most policy contexts is present-value 
 
 
 41. See generally James M. Poterba, Taxation, Risk-Taking, and Household Portfolio Behavior, 
in 3 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 1109–71 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 2002) 
(describing effects of taxation on portfolio allocation).  
 42. Id. 
 43. Brody, supra note 10, at 877–80. 
 44. Id. at 877. 
 45. UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 4(a), (d) (2006). 
 46. Brian Galle, Keep Charity Charitable, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1213, 1219 (2010). 
 47. MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: FEDERAL AND 
STATE LAW AND REGULATION 305–06 (2004). 
 48. See Geoffrey A. Manne, Agency Costs and the Oversight of Charitable Organizations, 1999 
WIS. L. REV. 227, 250–52. 
 49. See Garry W. Jenkins, Incorporation Choice, Uniformity, and the Reform of Nonprofit State 
Law, 41 GA. L. REV. 1113, 1128–29 (2007) (reporting number of each state’s attorney general 
employees assigned to charitable oversight).  
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analysis, also called time discounting.
50
 Over the rest of this Article, I will 
employ time-discounting analysis to evaluate restricted-spending policies. 
The basic process is intuitive: I will ask whether the social welfare 
produced by subsidizing restricted-spending policies is greater or less than 
other possible uses of the government’s money. Before I do that, though, I 
must deal with a major critique of time discounting raised by Professor 
Klausner, who claims that time discounting is “irrelevant” to the merits of 
restricted spending.
51
 In this Part, I will show that Klausner’s description 
of the significance of time discounting is no longer the most persuasive 
and that, in the end, present value is and must be a key part of serious 
policy analysis. That will set the stage for the two Parts to follow, each of 
which is in a sense aimed at identifying what components should go into 
our present-value analysis.  
A. Time Discounting: A Review 
It may be useful for some readers to begin with a review of the idea of 
the time value of money. Most readers know that, all else equal, the 
average investor would rather have money now than later.
52
 Suppose Kent 
loans money to Lois. While Lois has the funds, Kent cannot invest them. 
Therefore, Kent will want Lois to compensate him for the alternative 
investments he could have made in the meantime. To simplify a bit, these 
alternative investments are the time value of Kent’s money.53 We might 
then describe the value of some future promise to pay in terms of its 
“discounted present value.”54 By this we just mean: how much money 
would Kent have to invest today in order to have that much money at the 
time of Lois’s promised payment? The “discount rate” is the rate of return 
that Kent would have earned on his money.
55
     
We can extend this same concept to governments. When a policy 
maker is considering “investing” in some policy that will pay off in the 
future, she should want to think about her opportunity cost. Which will 
have a better payoff: building this bridge or instead investing the same 
 
 
 50. RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 16 (6th 
ed. 2000). 
 51. Klausner, supra note 11, at 53. 
 52. BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 50, at 16. 
 53. Id. at 22. A more complete version of the tale would also account for the risk Kent takes that 
Lois might not repay the debt. We might then separate the time value of money into purely riskless 
waiting, “the risk-free rate of return,” and a component that reflects the risky aspects. But that nuance 
is not particularly important for our analysis here.  
 54. Id. at 18–19. 
 55. Id. at 17. 
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money, collecting the proceeds, and spending the money later (on a bridge 
or something else)? Using present-value analysis to appraise the future 
value of projects implicitly builds in this opportunity-cost calculation: the 
policy maker is deciding how many future dollars she is giving up, 
assuming she could invest at the chosen discount rate.
56
      
It isn’t always easy to decide the correct discount rate. Sometimes, the 
government is comparing two different cash payoffs—that is the easy 
case. But many times, the government is comparing the non-cash payoff 
from a policy “investment” against the cash payoff from investing the 
policy’s cost instead, or even against the non-cash payoffs from 
implementing a different policy.
57
 While commentators mostly agree that 
the discount rate is important to any inter-temporal policy choice, these 
non-cash situations can raise special considerations that go into choosing 
the correct rate.
58
 Comparing cash to non-cash payoffs requires that both 
payoffs be converted into some common denominator, such as “utility” or 
well-being. Government shouldn’t give up $500,000 worth of present 
consumption unless the utility of the future payoff is greater than the 
utility earned by investing the money.
59
    
Another complication is that investments may have different payoffs at 
different points in time. Humans experience diminishing marginal utility 
from wealth; each dollar is more important to us when we have only a 
handful of them than when we have vaults stuffed with them.
60
 If future 
beneficiaries of government spending will be richer than we are in the 
present—as everyone expects they will be, on average—then the future 
utility payoff from government spending is correspondingly lower.
61
              
 
 
 56. Id. at 16. 
 57. KENNETH J. ARROW & MORDECAI KURZ, PUBLIC INVESTMENT, THE RATE OF RETURN, AND 
OPTIMAL FISCAL POLICY xxv (1971). 
 58. Richard L. Revesz & Matthew R. Shahabian, Climate Change and Future Generations, 84 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1097, 1101–20 (2011), and David Weisbach & Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change and 
Discounting the Future: A Guide for the Perplexed, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 433, 438–49 (2009), 
summarize the debate. See also Revesz & Shahabian, supra, at 1145 (conceding the importance of 
discounting but raising special considerations in the context of climate change).  
 59. See Bradley et al., supra note 10, at 7. 
 60. JONATHAN GRUBER, PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 322 (3d ed. 2011). 
 61. See Kenneth J. Arrow et al., Intertemporal Equity, Discounting, and Economic Efficiency, in 
CLIMATE CHANGE 1995: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 130, 131 (James 
P. Bruce, Hoesung Lee & Erik F. Haites eds., 1996); Partha Dasgupta, Discounting Climate Change, 
37 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 141, 150–64 (2008).  
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B. Is Time Money for Foundations? 
Let’s turn now to Klausner’s critique. Although Professor Klausner 
makes much of his rejection of time discounting,
62
 at the end of the day he 
accepts most of this framework. He agrees that the relative wealth of 
current and future generations is an important factor in the spend/save 
decision.
63
 And, consistent with the discounting literature, he concludes 
that charities should consider “how cost-effective a grant to current charity 
would be, compared to future charity”—that is, that foundations should 
consider opportunity costs.
64
 He maintains, though, that foundation 
savings shouldn’t be compared against the government’s potential 
investment return or against the payoffs from short-run charitable projects 
the foundation could have chosen to fund.
65
 Both these claims rest on 
unlikely assumptions.
66
 
First, Klausner’s description of the reason planners discount future 
payoffs by the government’s investment rate is less convincing than other 
accounts. Klausner claims that “by discounting future grants to present 
value, we would be saying that” future people’s lives are less important 
“simply because [they] live at different times.”67 As David Weisbach and 
Cass Sunstein have explained, however, we could value future and present 
lives equally and still want to consider the government’s opportunity 
costs.
68
 Indeed, to do otherwise would be unethical: it would be throwing 
money away, money that could benefit the present and future both. Again, 
 
 
 62. Klausner, supra note 11, at 52–55. 
 63. Id. at 57; see also Hansmann, supra note 10, at 14. 
 64. Klausner, supra note 11, at 57; see also Schramm, supra note 10, at 400. 
 65.  Klausner, supra note 11, at 58. 
 66. In conversations after he generously agreed to read this draft, Professor Klausner suggests 
that his article is not best read to make the argument I attribute to him here. Instead, he makes two 
distinct points. First, that there should be no “pure time preference,” that is, no discounting of the 
returns to projects that benefit future generations solely because they are in the future. And, while he 
agrees that saving should be compared with the opportunity cost of spending, he believes that using the 
time value of money is an inapt way of accounting for opportunity cost.   
 Framed in this way, it may be that my differences with Professor Klausner are semantic. We both 
would compare the total returns available throughout time from a spending project against those 
available from investing funds instead. My view is that we can use the language and methodology of 
time discounting to engage in that comparison, albeit using a “social” discount rate that reflects the 
returns to spending projects, as well as a potentially negative adjustment to the rate of return earned by 
investments to account for the costs of deferred spending I describe in the next Part. Klausner would 
avoid using discount rates altogether, as he seems to believe they are too easily confused with pure 
time preferences. He would instead simply add the value of each alternative over its expected life. And 
he appears to conclude that there are a relatively narrow, albeit potentially important, set of spending 
projects with the potential for long-term payoffs. 
 67. Id. at 53–54. 
 68. Weisbach & Sunstein, supra note 58, at 450–51. 
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by applying a market discount rate, in effect we are asking, “Which would 
produce more wealth for the future: funding this project or investing the 
money?” If the project would pay less than an investment would, how 
does it serve the future to fund the project?       
Klausner also is unpersuasive when he suggests that foundations (and, 
presumably, the society that subsidizes them) need not weigh the benefit 
of restricted spending against the lost opportunity to fund short-term 
projects.
69
 That is, his view seems to be that foundations don’t have to 
show that their investment returns exceed the “return” that spending could 
produce. There are many ways charitable spending today could benefit the 
future. Economic development might create a path of economic growth 
that enriches later generations.
70
 Future research could build on present-
day discoveries.
71
 But Klausner seemingly would consider these 
alternatives only if the social return “continues in perpetuity” and 
“produces benefits that compound . . . at a higher rate than assets in the 
foundation’s portfolio.”72 
It looks, therefore, as though Klausner’s objection to considering 
opportunity costs is about math. The idea seems to be that, over an infinite 
amount of time, a foundation’s investment returns will outstrip the value 
of any finite spending project. Only spending projects whose benefits 
continue indefinitely are a better choice than investing, and even then only 
if their “rates of return” are consistently higher. This fits with standard 
models of capital budgeting—that is, plans for how to allocate firm 
resources over time—which suggest that firms spend so as to obtain an 
equal marginal return on their expenditures in each time period.
73
 If the 
firm plans to exist for an indefinite period, and if we assume that on 
average the returns on expenditures are similar each year, it should spend 
roughly its net-of-inflation investment returns each year.
74
 Spending out of 
principal would reduce the marginal payoff in future periods, unless that 
extra spending could itself provide value in future years in excess of the 
investment return.  
While the math here is right, the assumption that foundations will exist 
literally forever is very implausible. Realistically, no foundation will live 
 
 
 69. Klausner, supra note 11, at 55. 
 70. See BREST & HARVEY, supra note 10, at 261; Deep & Frumkin, supra note 10, at 4–5. 
 71. See Irvin, supra note 10, at 448. 
 72. Klausner, supra note 11, at 55, 57. 
 73. See ARROW & KURZ, supra note 57, at xx–xxi. 
 74. Perry Mehrling, Endowment Spending Policy: An Economist’s Perspective, in FUTURES 
FORUM 2004 53, 53–55 (2004); John E. Core & Thomas Donaldson, An Economic and Ethical 
Approach to Charity and to Charity Endowments, 68 REV. SOC. ECON. 261, 269 (2010). 
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on in perpetuity, even if we can’t now predict its exact end date. So it is 
inaccurate to compute the value of investing by assuming an infinite life. 
But how long should we assume? Often, the answer doesn’t matter. 
Imagine that we are comparing the value of investing against a spending 
project, using the standard compound-returns formula to compute each 
one: 
(Ui =P0(1 + ri)
n 
)
   
> <   (Us =P0(1 + rs)
m 
)
       
(1)
 
where Ui and Us are the utility payoffs from investing and spending, r is 
the annual rate of return on each option, and n and m are the expected life 
spans of the foundation and the spending project, respectively. If n and m 
are equal, then we can cancel them from each side of the inequality, with 
the result that we would choose whichever option has a higher rate of 
return.  
The expected life of the foundation will often drop out of our 
calculations in this way because many projects a foundation takes on will 
have an expected life as long as the foundation itself. Perhaps investing in 
advances in chemotherapy will not have an infinite payout, assuming that 
someday gene therapy will supersede chemo as a leading cancer treatment. 
Will that day come before or after foundations are no longer a sensible 
social arrangement, laws change, or future managers of the foundation find 
a way to bring its operations to a halt?
75
 We don’t know, and that makes 
the expected life of the investment effectively the same as that of the 
foundation.      
Where then does this analysis leave us? As Klausner concedes, 
foundations’ decisions to restrict their spending should be measured 
against the lost opportunities this decision presents.
76
 Doing otherwise 
would cheat future generations as much as it would cheat present-day 
taxpayers. In addition, I’ve argued here that to justify government support 
for restricted spending, foundation savings should have to beat two 
benchmarks. First, the utility payoff to future spending—net of all the 
costs and benefits that delay might bring—should exceed the 
government’s investment opportunity: when the government gives 
foundations a dollar, the utility of future spending should equal or exceed 
the utility we could get from a dollar of present spending. Second, the net 
payoff should exceed any returns that the foundation could achieve by 
 
 
 75. Cf. Weisbach & Sunstein, supra note 58, at 454–55 (noting that the duration of any inter-
generational transfer is uncertain because of the possibility of acts by intervening generations). 
 76. Klausner, supra note 11, at 55–58; Hansmann, supra note 10, at 18. 
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spending now on projects whose useful life is expected to be just as 
“perpetual” as the foundation itself.  
III. THE COSTS OF WAITING 
My argument so far is that it is important to consider whether the future 
payoffs that a restricted-spending foundation can deliver are better than the 
alternatives of unrestricted spending, or of eliminating the government’s 
subsidy and investing that money for some other kind of future spending 
instead. In this Part, therefore, I examine some factors that might 
potentially diminish the value of charitable spending deferred by 
foundations into the future. I show that short-term spending can have long-
lasting impact, that future charitable spending is likely to be less valuable 
because the growing philanthropic sector will have to turn to lower-
priority projects, and that spreading spending out over time introduces 
several different forms of agency and information costs. In the last 
Subpart, I’ll discuss a counterargument that might apply to all these 
points: that the charitable contribution deduction, by its very nature, 
commits the decision to accept these costs to charities, not the 
government.  
A. Opportunity Costs 
First, as we saw in Part II.B, even proponents of restricted spending 
agree that foundations could increase returns to society by investing in 
projects that last in perpetuity. Realistically speaking, those projects don’t 
have to last forever to, in expectation, beat foundation savings; they just 
have to have an expected life that approximates the foundation’s own. 
Every one of these projects that goes unfunded due to government policies 
favoring foundation savings is a waste of resources. If projects with this 
kind of indefinitely lived value are rare, though, perhaps this is a minor 
concern. 
In fact, though, because foundations are engines for innovation, it very 
well could be that almost every project in which a foundation engages 
potentially has value that could continue growing as long as or longer than 
the foundation itself. It might be the case that grants to provide hospice 
care for the terminally ill won’t benefit the future much directly, but 
discovering new methods for delivering that care likely will. Every project 
the foundation engages in can potentially be a source of information for 
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the next grant, for other operating charities, and for other foundations.
77
 
Foundation advocates claim repeatedly that foundations are almost unique 
in society in their power to use their grant-making ability to experiment, 
measure outcomes, and derive lessons for the future.
78
 If so, though, delays 
in grant-making also deny the world the opportunity to benefit from those 
lessons.  
Even if not every project has this informational value, the claim that 
time-limited projects inevitably pale in comparison to an opportunity to 
invest forever is overstated. Again, it is unrealistic to believe foundations 
really are timeless. Few foundations in the world today are more than one 
hundred years old.
79
 Compound interest for one or two hundred years is 
powerful, but many time-limited projects could well rival that return, 
especially if we expect that the product could outlive the foundations 
themselves.  
B. Diminishing Marginal Returns: Redistribution and the Growth of the 
Foundation Sector 
Next, future spending might deliver a smaller payoff than spending 
today because of diminishing marginal returns. We have already seen one 
aspect of that argument: future generations could be wealthier than ours, 
on average. That implies that, if anything, we should borrow money from 
the future and spend it today.
80
   
Another possibility, with similar implications, is that the foundation 
sector itself could be growing. Let’s assume that foundations tend to fund 
their highest-value projects first, however subjectively “value” is 
defined.
81
 As the foundation sector expands, it will have to choose projects 
lower and lower down on its list. The same is true of each individual 
foundation, assuming that foundation managers have somewhat 
idiosyncratic tastes relative to other managers: as the foundation gets 
richer, its marginal project has a lower payoff. Standard capital budgeting 
theory, we’ve seen, prescribes that a firm in that situation should shift the 
money to a time period when its marginal returns will be higher.
82
    
 
 
 77. FLEISHMAN, supra note 10, at 3–9; Porter & Kramer, supra note 31, at 123–25. 
 78. BREST & HARVEY, supra note 10, at 262–63; Schramm, supra note 10, at 398–400, 404. 
 79. ZUNZ, supra note 5, at 37–68. 
 80. Hansmann, supra note 10, at 14. 
 81. See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 50, at 257–82 (describing methods of prioritizing 
projects for firms). 
 82. Cf. Timothy R. Yoder & Brian P. McAllister, Do Private Foundations Increase Current 
Distributions to Qualify for a 50 Percent Tax Rate Reduction?, 34 J. AM. ACCT. ASS’N 45, 51 (2012) 
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What’s happening to the size of foundations and to the foundation 
sector overall? In Part V.C.2, I report new empirical findings on the rate of 
growth of foundation assets. To preview briefly, I find steady growth in 
the real (i.e., net of inflation) value of private foundations’ assets, 
including investment income and new donations but omitting 
expenditures—in other words, in the amount of money that would be 
available for spending. Together, new contributions and investment 
earnings offer a mean growth rate of about eighteen percent, after 
inflation. The foundation sector, in other words, is growing rapidly, and 
those figures do not include the even faster expansion of donor-advised 
funds.  
Unless Congress has some reason to believe that the marginal value of 
future charitable spending will be higher than present charitable spending, 
this trend seems to fly in the face of the capital budgeting principles I’ve 
just outlined. Today’s foundations should to some extent borrow against 
the value of future foundation growth by spending down their assets and 
letting new money replace those funds.
83
 To equalize marginal returns in 
each period, assuming that on average projects of equal value are available 
each year, foundations could spend up to their growth rate each year—
here, on the order of eighteen percent of their assets annually.  
Current spending levels are considerably lower. Drawing on the sample 
of tax returns described in the Appendix, I computed average payout rates 
for organizations categorized as private foundations for tax purposes over 
several recent decades.
84
 I separated spending rates according to whether 
organizations have received any recent donations.
85
 This division is 
intended to reflect the possibility that firms with active donors may behave 
differently from those whose donors are deceased or otherwise no longer 
actively involved with the firm. Figure 1 below summarizes the result.  
 
 
(“By distributing assets contemporaneously, foundations reduce their ability to distribute assets in the 
future when a higher philanthropic return may be available.”); Halperin, supra note 10 (suggesting that 
endowment spending rules should account for future contributions). 
 83. Cf. Deep & Frumkin, supra note 10, at 8 (“The availability of . . . new funds for giving in the 
future should make higher levels of giving today more appealing.”). Admittedly, it is possible that the 
marginal returns curve on foundation spending is very flat—that is, that marginal returns diminish very 
slowly. This might be the case if foundations are now reaching only a small fraction of the neediest 
charities.   
 84. My computation is simply an averaging across firms of the mean payout rate each firm 
reported on its tax return for the five-year period ending in the return year. New firms, of course, may 
report a period of fewer than five years, but for simplicity I include these together with other firms. I 
winsorize the sample and weight firm observations by assets, as described in the Appendix. 
 85. I define “recent” as the tax return year and the four preceding years.   
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FIGURE 1: SELF-REPORTED PAYOUT RATES AT PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS, 
BY RECENT GIVING STATUS 
Notes:  Self-reported 5-year payout ratios. Winsorized and asset weighted. “Recent” gifts are gifts 
within 5 years of current period. Source: PF-SOI 2011 Cumulative File. 
As Figure 1 demonstrates, average payout rates reported by private 
foundations are well below sustainable levels. Indeed, among foundations 
without recent gifts, payouts hover close to the statutory minimum of five 
percent annually. 
C. Project Selection, Agency Costs, and Information 
As many prior commentators have observed, stretching foundation 
spending over time tends to reduce the value of that spending through two 
additional mechanisms. One is agency costs: over time, it becomes harder 
for donors to constrain the impulses of managers who may prefer to hold 
down spending in order to shield themselves from risk and reduce effort or 
to spend in ways that contravene the donors’ preferences.86 Another is 
 
 
 86. See Lester M. Salamon, Foundations as Investment Managers Part I: The Process, 3 
NONPROFIT MANAGEMENT & LEADERSHIP 117, 118 (1992) [hereinafter Salamon, The Process]; Deep 
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information: even if donors could perfectly control their agents, the 
donor’s ability to best target her spending will get ever more stale over 
time.
87
 In this Subpart, I want to add some less-familiar aspects of these 
problems.  
First, and most simply, a relatively unfamiliar argument about 
restricted spending is that it presents an informational dilemma for the 
government as well as for donors. In theory, government subsidies or other 
incentives should be attuned so that the marginal social benefit generated 
by another dollar of charitable activity is equal to the incentive’s marginal 
cost.
88
 Restricted spending forces the government to forecast both,
89
 and 
the more restricted the spending is, the longer the range of the forecast. As 
the forecast gets fuzzier, the likelihood increases that the government will 
do something socially wasteful: either overpay to encourage behavior that 
is not cost-effective or underpay and leave some beneficial behavior still 
on the table.
90
 Some scholars have argued that when the government faces 
this level of uncertainty about the payoff from its policies, it should not 
award up-front subsidies at all, but should instead wait until after the 
behavior it wants to encourage occurs.
91
 
Second, recent work on the psychology of foundation managers 
suggests yet another possible wedge that time might drive between the 
manager and donor. Studies report that foundation managers are often 
motivated in significant part by the amount of the assets under their 
control, rather than by what those assets can accomplish—a classic 
example of “empire building.”92 Managers also tend to favor accumulation 
 
 
& Frumkin, supra note 10, at 7–8, 10–11 (noting, inter alia, that managers prefer restricted spending 
because it protects their jobs, but describing this as an argument in favor of the practice). For evidence, 
see John E. Core, Wayne R. Guay & Rodrigo S. Verdi, Agency Problems of Excess Endowment 
Holdings in Not-for-Profit Firms, 41 J. ACCT. & ECON. 307, 309 (2006), and Mihir A. Desai & Robert 
J. Yetman, Constraining Managers Without Owners: Governance of the Not-for-Profit Enterprise, 4 J. 
GOVERNMENTAL & NONPROFIT ACCT. 53, 70 (2015). 
 87. Hansmann, supra note 10, at 33–34; Irvin, supra note 10, at 449; see also Brody, supra note 
10, at 919, 922, 942. But see FLEISHMAN, supra note 10, at 246–47 (arguing that foundations are 
valuable because they “allow the values of past generations to provide a counterweight to . . . the 
present”). 
 88. See GRUBER, supra note 60, at 135. 
 89. Recall that under current law, restricted spending is subsidized both through an up-front tax 
deduction and also by an ongoing exemption for the investment returns of the charity.  
 90. See Steven Shavell, Corrective Taxation Versus Liability as a Solution to the Problem of 
Harmful Externalities, 54 J.L. & ECON. S249, S256 (2011). 
 91. See Donald Wittman, Prior Regulation Versus Post Liability: The Choice Between Input and 
Output Monitoring, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 193, 200 (1977). 
 92. Gian Paolo Barbetta et al., The Impact of Fiscal Rules on the Grant-Making Behavior of 
American Foundations 16 (Universitá Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Working Paper No. 9, 2012); Deep & 
Frumkin, supra note 10, at 16–18. 
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over program activities because of measurability bias: it is easier to 
evaluate the performance of the firm’s investments than of its programs, 
and hence managers favor investing over spending.
93
 
A last point also deals with information, but it will take a bit of 
unpacking. Let’s begin by returning to the idea that firms optimally 
allocate their resources when they equalize the marginal returns to 
spending in each time period. This is as true of donee firms, the operating 
charities, as it is for foundations. Restricted spending can interfere with 
operating charities’ ability to allocate their money. In essence, restricted 
spending forces some operating charities to wait to obtain resources that in 
some cases could have been spent more efficiently in earlier periods. For 
instance, it is unlikely that the best use of a soup kitchen’s money is to 
have zero dollars for four years and then a million dollars in the fifth, 
rather than $200,000 each year. Of course, if the operating foundation 
could borrow, this wouldn’t be a problem, but most charities are severely 
credit-constrained,
94
 and many nonprofit managers are averse to taking on 
debt that could increase the risk of bankruptcy.
95
  
Foundations could overcome this problem if they had perfect 
information about the plans and operations of the donee firms. A perfectly 
informed foundation would parcel out more or less money to each donee 
each year, depending on the payoff. In other words, the foundation would 
make grants that match the spending pattern the operating foundation 
would choose. The problem, of course, is that the foundation managers 
don’t have that information, and they usually can’t rely on the donee firm 
to provide it. This information asymmetry problem comes up in many 
other contexts, such as government grants and insurer-insured 
relationships.
96
 In the literatures studying those fields, scholars report that 
information transfers are imperfect because one party may have incentives 
to only convey information favorable to its interests, because information 
gathering is costly, and because some crucial information may be hard to 
reduce to writing.
97
 
 
 
 93. Deep & Frumkin, supra note 10, at 16. 
 94. Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 877 (1980); see 
also Brody, supra note 10, at 889. 
 95. See Hansmann, supra note 10, at 36. 
 96. See, e.g., Paul M. Healy & Krishna G. Palepu, Information Asymmetry, Corporate 
Disclosure, and the Capital Markets: A Review of the Empirical Disclosure Literature, 31 J. ACCT. & 
ECON. 405, 420–26 (2001); Jonas Prager, Contracting Out Government Services: Lessons from the 
Private Sector, 54 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 176, 179 (1994). 
 97. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND PUBLIC 
POLICY 60 (1986). 
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An alternative strategy for the foundation would be simply to award all 
the money it plans to give to an operating charity up front and let the 
donee firm allocate those funds over time, but that plan also has problems. 
Once the donee firm has the funds, its managers may slack or diverge 
from the plans they promised. Those managers also are unlikely to 
surrender the funds in the event some other, more productive project 
appears at another firm. Therefore, a donor might be willing to incur the 
information costs of holding back funds in order to obtain greater 
accountability and flexibility.
98
    
While at first glance this theory seems to support restricted spending by 
foundations, in fact it undermines it. Individual donors could obtain the 
benefits of accountability and flexibility by holding donated funds in their 
own name and then contributing directly to operating charities when the 
time seems right.
99
 Adding a foundation in between, and directing it to 
restrict its spending, introduces exactly the two problems that waiting 
supposedly solves: it allows the foundation managers to diverge from the 
donor’s preferences, and it reduces flexibility. Once funds are contributed 
to the foundation, they cannot lawfully be returned to the donor.
100
 This 
means that if the donor comes upon a highly productive investment 
opportunity, she can’t shift money from the foundation to that use (and 
then potentially back again).
101 
 
In short, restricted-spending foundations are likely to be less efficient 
than foundations that award their funds quickly, because donee firms have 
better information about when that money should be spent. Although 
donors may be willing to pay that information cost in order to gain 
 
 
 98. See Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 
76 AM. ECON. REV. 323, 323–24 (1986) (arguing that the need to return to funders for additional 
capital can reduce agency costs); Edward L. Glaeser, The Governance of Not-for-Profit Firms 37–44 
(Harvard Inst. of Econ. Research, Discussion Paper No. 1954, 2002) (same). David Walker and I 
report evidence that this theory also has some traction in the nonprofit setting, finding that dependence 
on outside donors can affect the managerial decisions of university presidents. Brian Galle & David I. 
Walker, Nonprofit Executive Pay as an Agency Problem: Evidence from U.S. Colleges and 
Universities, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1881, 1917–18 (2014). 
 99. See FLEISHMAN, supra note 10, at 240–41 (2007) (noting that the two options are often 
equivalent). 
 100. See I.R.C. §§ 170(f)(3), 2055(e)(2) (2014). 
 101. Of course, the foundation could also pursue the investment opportunity available to the 
donor. We know from recent work in international taxation, however, that the “lock up” of assets 
inside a firm can create severe economic distortions. The identity of the owner of an investment can 
matter a lot to how well that investment pays off. See Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines Jr., Old Rules 
and New Realities: Corporate Tax Policy in a Global Setting, 57 NAT’L TAX J. 937, 956–57 (2004). 
Professors Klick and Sitkoff have shown evidence that the ownership of assets affects value in the 
foundation context. Jonathan Klick & Robert H. Sitkoff, Agency Costs, Charitable Trusts, and 
Corporate Control: Evidence from Hershey’s Kiss-Off, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 814–16 (2008). 
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accountability and flexibility, foundations reduce those two very things. 
The accountability and flexibility factors could net out to either social 
gains or losses from foundation restricted spending, but we presently have 
no evidence on how they play out. For now, if we assume that they 
roughly balance out on average, the net result is that restricted-spending 
foundations create imperfect information without any offsetting benefit.  
Having said all of that, there may be some situations in which it would 
be beneficial for society to encourage donors to “lock up” their assets in a 
foundation, even if that strategy reduces the value of the assets. For 
instance, lockups may be a way of transferring resources from a time when 
they have a low marginal utility (say, a booming economy) to a time when 
they will have a higher marginal utility (say, a recession). We’ll return to 
that thought in Part IV. 
D. Let Charity Decide?  
Before moving on, though, I want to consider a counterargument that 
could be raised to most or all the arguments I’ve addressed in this Part. A 
standard view among most scholars of the nonprofit sector is that the 
foibles of managers and errors of donors are the price society must pay for 
the private production of public goods.
102
 That is, since one of the central 
goals of charity is to challenge or provide an alternative to majoritarian 
government, the assumption is that it would be counterproductive to have 
government bureaucrats or elected officials second-guessing or 
influencing charities’ choices.103 Putting this point another way, we might 
say that the majority’s dislike for a charity’s choices shouldn’t count as an 
additional cost, since that very dislike is a reason for the subsidy. For 
instance, I suggested that restricted spending could cause undesirable 
redistribution, but some commentators believe that charities should be free 
to be as redistributive (or not) as they choose.
104
 
Whatever its general merits, this argument is not very persuasive as a 
justification for policies that actually encourage restricted spending. It is 
one thing to accept what to government eyes is wasteful charity when that 
is the price of vibrant and diverse uses of the charitable contribution 
 
 
 102. FLEISHMAN, supra note 10, at 22–24; Kenneth L. Karst, The Efficiency of the Charitable 
Dollar: An Unfulfilled State Responsibility, 73 HARV. L. REV. 433, 462 (1960); see also Rob Atkinson, 
Reforming Cy Pres Reform, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1111, 1137–38 (1993). 
 103. FLEISHMAN, supra note 10, at 23–24. 
 104. Miranda Perry Fleischer, Theorizing the Charitable Tax Subsidies: The Role of Distributive 
Justice, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 505, 530–31 (2010) (identifying and critiquing theories that implicitly 
adopt this view). 
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deduction. It is another for government deliberately to set in place 
additional policies that encourage waste. That is, if the only question were 
whether restricted-spending charities should be eligible for the same 
subsidies all other charities can claim, the answer might well be yes. But 
the question instead is whether government’s extra subsidies for restricted 
spending—full deductions at the time of contribution, exemption of 
investment earnings, and so on—can be justified. Denying those subsidies 
does not sacrifice charitable autonomy, since the restricted-spending funds 
could be given over to present-day charity instead.  
Putting this point another way, we might say that our fundamental 
policy question is whether foundation managers are likely to spend faster 
or slower than the socially optimal level. As we have already seen, 
managers have incentives and ways of thinking about restricted spending 
that may cause them to tend to spend slower than an outside observer 
would. Unless there is some story about why these incentives and frames 
of reference reflect genuine charitable interests, and not externalities, 
agency costs, and cognitive bias, the managerial preference for delay 
would not seem to command the same kind of deference as other 
charitable choices. 
Limits on charitable choice are often defensible, in any event. For 
example, when charities produce significant negative externalities, the 
diversity rationale is harder to invoke: the charity is not only going its own 
way, but is also dragging others along. As I’ve argued elsewhere, the 
assumption that government cannot limit some charitable decisions 
without threatening charitable independence underestimates tools of the 
modern administrative state.
105
 For instance, clear and simple rules can 
limit the discretion of government actors who might disfavor unpopular 
charities. Judicial review, and the threat of it and other kinds of outside 
evaluation, also constrain administrative biases.  
Limiting restricted spending fits this model of where government can 
regulate charitable choice effectively. Restricted spending deprives the 
future of information, renders operating charities less efficient, imposes 
added enforcement costs on state attorneys general and the IRS, and 
creates unwanted redistribution. With a few mechanical rules, such as 
guidelines on how rapidly a firm should spend its assets, many of these 
problems could be curtailed. Part V addresses some of these rules in more 
detail. 
 
 
 105. Brian Galle, The Role of Charity in a Federal System, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 777, 848–50 
(2012). 
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IV. THE VALUE OF FUTURE SPENDING 
So far, I’ve argued that restricted spending is socially costly in several 
important respects. I now turn to considering the other side: what are the 
benefits of paying out slowly over time? Earlier commentators have 
identified five main arguments in favor of restricted spending. One, the 
idea of intergenerational equity, we’ve already seen. That claim ultimately 
depends on whether future spending might be more valuable than 
spending today. While the other four arguments bear on that point, none is 
persuasive. At best, they weigh in favor of long-lived entities, but not 
necessarily long-term restrictions on spending by those entities. But there 
are some other possibilities that have not been seriously developed 
elsewhere that merit more thoughtful consideration. In particular, the 
latent power of foundations to buoy the economy during recessions and to 
rival the national government both could justify relatively long-term 
spending projects.
106
 I argue, though, that neither of these goals merits a 
permanent endowment; both counsel that at some point spending limits 
should be lifted.  
A. Prior Justifications for Restricted Spending 
Prior authors set out four basic claims about why restricted spending 
might be more valuable than other forms of charity. Most simply, they 
claim that donors value perpetual life.
107
 This claim underwrites two 
separate rationales for subsidizing perpetuities: first, that perpetual life 
increases the “warm glow” donors experience;108 and second, that in doing 
so it also triggers increased total giving.
109
 Third, commentators argue that 
foundations have institutional expertise or economies of scope that make 
their spending more efficient, so that it would be wasteful for them to 
close their doors after spending down their endowment.
110
 Lastly, 
foundation advocates claim that a foundation’s best project might not arise 
for many years. None of these claims survives careful scrutiny. 
 
 
 106. Prior commentators have suggested that foundations could help to fight recessions, see 
NONPROFITS AND GOVERNMENTS: COLLABORATION AND CONFLICT 3 (Elizabeth T. Boris & C. 
Eugene Steuerle eds., 2006); Desai & Yetman, supra note 86, at 58, but have not explained why this 
should be a task for the nonprofit sector in particular. 
 107. Irvin, supra note 10, at 449. 
 108. E.g., Adam J. Hirsch, Bequests for Purposes: A Unified Theory, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 33, 
52, 53 & nn.74, 84 (1999). 
 109. Karst, supra note 102, at 475. 
 110. See infra Part IV.A.2. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss5/5
  
 
 
 
 
2016] PAY IT FORWARD? 1169 
 
 
 
 
1. Donor Preferences for Restricted Spending 
No doubt, donors value long-lasting recognition for their generosity. A 
visit to the entry hall of any museum or opera house can tell us that.
111
 
Some commentators suggest that the opportunity to satisfy these 
preferences is itself a reason to favor perpetual gifts.
112
 Alternatively, and I 
think more plausibly, others claim that allowing long-term restrictions on 
gifts, especially restrictions on spending, encourages donors to give.
113
 
I should first note that, as several eminent commentators have 
observed, there is no empirical support for the proposition that restricted 
spending encourages donations.
114
 Donors may like perpetuities, but it 
could be that those who value perpetuities the most are those who were 
already the most inclined to donate. While prior studies find that donors 
actively shop for states that will allow perpetual trusts,
115
 that 
jurisdictional competition seems entirely driven by federal tax benefits that 
accompany trusts with unlimited lives.
116
 
In any event, the possibility that donors have preferences for limited 
spending argues for lesser, not greater, government cash subsidies for 
limited-spending gifts. In essence, we could think of the two approaches, 
tax subsidies and government support for restricted spending, as 
substitutes. I agree on this front with John Colombo, who points out that 
government is justified in offering subsidies when markets fail, but that 
 
 
 111. William A. Drennan, Surnamed Charitable Trusts: Immortality at Taxpayer Expense, 61 
ALA. L. REV. 225, 239–40 (2010). 
 112. See MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, THE URBAN INST. & THE HAUSER CTR. FOR NONPROFIT 
ORGS., ACCUMULATIONS OF WEALTH BY NONPROFITS 2–3 (2004); Hirsch, supra note 108, at 84; see 
also Deep & Frumkin, supra note 10, at 11 (suggesting that preference of managers for conservative 
spending is a reason to limit payout); cf. Daniel B. Kelly, Restricting Testamentary Freedom: Ex Ante 
Versus Ex Post Justifications, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 1125, 1147–49 (2013) (making this argument in 
support of donor conditions generally). 
 113. Charles H. Hamilton, Payout Redux, in VIII CONVERSATIONS ON PHILANTHROPY: 
PHILANTHROPIC REFLECTIONS 28, 33 (2011); LEWIS M. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 
117 (1955); Brody, supra note 10, at 942; see also Drennan, supra note 111, at 253 (noting this 
argument). 
 114. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 19.3 (9th ed. 2014); 4A AUSTIN 
WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 399.4 (1989); Alex M. 
Johnson, Jr., Limiting Dead Hand Control of Charitable Trusts: Expanding the Use of the Cy Pres 
Doctrine, 21 U. HAW. L. REV. 353, 357 (1999). Scott and others argue that history, in fact, teaches the 
opposite, but historical anecdote admittedly cannot rule out possible confounding factors. Atkinson, 
supra note 102, at 1133 n.79. 
 115. Robert H. Sitkoff & Max M. Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competition for Trust Funds: An 
Empirical Analysis of Perpetuities and Taxes, 115 YALE L.J. 356, 410 (2005). 
 116. Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Perpetuities or Taxes? Explaining the Rise of 
the Perpetual Trust, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2465, 2495–97 (2006). 
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markets for naming rights seem to function just fine.
117
 The more donors 
want to give, the less the government needs to support their giving. If 
donors want to give more when their gifts can be subject to restricted-
spending rules, government’s support in dollars can be lower. 
In more technical terms, the greater self-satisfaction that comes with 
permanent recognition implies that those donors are likely to be infra-
marginal: the government’s cash, while costly to the public, does not 
increase the donor’s contribution.118 A third, closely-related point is that 
the donors’ utility is private consumption, while optimal subsidies for the 
production of positive externalities should depend only on the spillover 
benefits to others.
119
   
Perhaps what prior commentators have meant to say is that rules 
encouraging the use of perpetuities are a less socially costly way of 
encouraging giving than tax subsidies.
120
 If so, this claim would be 
dubious. One reason to doubt it is that the social costs of perpetuities are 
not measured in any government budget. Since perpetuities are “off 
budget,” the political discipline that at least gently constrains most tax 
incentives has not weighed on them.
121
 In other words, it is unlikely that 
society’s choice to encourage perpetual gifts reflects a considered 
judgment about their efficiency.  
The best argument for the efficiency of perpetuities would likely be the 
case in which there are some donors with strong preferences for future 
spending, but only weak sensitivity to cash incentives. A pair of 
economists recently predicted that perpetuities could increase giving under 
 
 
 117. John D. Colombo, The Marketing of Philanthropy and the Charitable Contributions 
Deduction: Integrating Theories for the Deduction and Tax Exemption, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 657, 
695, 699–700 (2001); see also William A. Drennan, Where Generosity and Pride Abide: Charitable 
Naming Rights, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 45, 48, 69 (2011). 
 118. See MOLLY F. SHERLOCK & JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40919, AN 
OVERVIEW OF THE NONPROFIT AND CHARITABLE SECTOR 49 (2009) (explaining that government 
should not subsidize contributions from infra-marginal donors). 
 119. LOUIS KAPLOW, THE THEORY OF TAXATION AND PUBLIC ECONOMICS 28–29 (2008). In any 
event, the donor’s utility properly measured, is likely to be tiny relative to the costs of the 
government’s subsidies. Once the donor is dead, she no longer can care about her reputation. But see 
THE SIXTH SENSE (Buena Vista Pictures 1999). She might take some bit of added satisfaction during 
life at the thought of her name being carved in stone. Kelly, supra note 112, at 1147–49. But that 
feeling is fleeting, while the government’s subsidies will, by definition, last in perpetuity.  
 120. Or, as Peter Diamond suggests, of reducing the deadweight loss of progressive taxation. Peter 
Diamond, Optimal Tax Treatment of Private Contributions for Public Goods with and Without Warm 
Glow Preferences, 90 J. PUB. ECON. 897, 898–99 (2006). 
 121. See Steven A. Dean, The Tax Expenditure Budget Is a Zombie Accountant, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 265, 286–88 (2012) (summarizing ways in which budgeting imposes political constraints on 
spending). 
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that assumption.
122
 The existing evidence, though, largely suggests the 
opposite: wealthy donors are both the most sensitive to tax incentives and 
also the most likely to give to restricted-spending vehicles.
123
     
Whatever the relative efficiency of taxes and perpetuities as stimulants 
to giving, there still is no argument for granting more generous tax 
subsidies when a gift carries spending restrictions. The whole premise of 
the efficiency argument would be that restricted spending is useful because 
it permits lesser tax subsidies. And it is similarly incoherent to offer tax 
subsidies for perpetuities in order to appeal to donors who are indifferent 
to tax subsidies.  
I should emphasize that I am not proposing to outlaw perpetual gifts. I 
agree with scholars who maintain that, all else equal, individuals have 
some right to dispose of their property as they choose.
124
 The question for 
this Part is whether there are reasons to encourage restricted spending.  
2. Firm-Specific Value 
Another argument sometimes advanced for restricted-spending policies 
is that grant-making institutions add value.
125
 For example, Paul Brest, 
erstwhile Dean of Stanford Law School and former President of the 
Hewlett Foundation, argues that major grant-making organizations have 
developed expertise in their project areas, and have ties to networks of 
experts who can support, guide, and evaluate the work of the grantees.
126
 
These kinds of expertise are closely tied up in human capital: the staff’s 
knowledge, their sense of how to work collaboratively with one another 
and outside experts, and their ability to trust the judgment of their working 
partners. While that capital could be replicated or reassembled, Brest 
 
 
 122. Levine & Sansing, supra note 30, at 167. 
 123. See IRS STATISTICS OF INCOME, CHARITABLE GIVING AND THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: WHAT 
TAX DATA CAN TELL US (2014) (reporting that giving to private foundations is predominantly from 
the top one percent of households by income); LILY FAMILY SCHOOL OF PHILANTHROPY AT INDIANA 
UNIVERSITY, GIVING USA 2014, at 140 (2014); Jon Bakija, Tax Policy and Philanthropy: A Primer on 
the Empirical Evidence for the United States and Its Implications, 80 SOC. RES. 557, 571 (2013) 
(finding evidence that price-elasticity of giving is higher among higher-income donors). It is true that 
some of the reason for the prevalence of wealthy donors in restricted-spending vehicles is the 
relatively higher transaction costs of that form of giving, so that the pattern of observed giving may not 
reflect solely the underlying preferences of donors. But the possibility that restricted gifts carry higher 
transaction costs only serves to make our point about the lower efficiency of that form.  
 124. Hansmann, supra note 10, at 33. 
 125. BREST & HARVEY, supra note 10, at 264. 
 126. See id.  
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suggests, doing so would be very costly.
127
 Why, then, would we want to 
force such an organization to spend all its money and dissolve?   
Another way this point is sometimes put is that foundations generate 
large economies of scope.
128
 Society might get a much bigger bang for its 
subsidy dollar by underwriting foundations, because the foundation is 
overseeing many projects at once. That puts the foundation’s staff in a 
position to be able to compare the projects to each other, see potential 
synergies, and apply lessons learned in one project to others. Joel 
Fleishman, a Duke professor who once was a senior official at The 
Atlantic Philanthropies, makes a version of this claim when he suggests 
that foundations are a key source of policy experimentation: the 
foundation can support several alternative ways of achieving the same 
policy goal, then put its money behind the one that proves to work best 
and advocate for it over time.
129
  
These are powerful arguments, but they make a case only for long-
lived institutions, not restricted spending. It is true that some 
organizations, including Fleishman’s own The Atlantic Philanthropies, 
have decided intentionally to spend all of the foundation’s available 
funds.
130
 The Gates Foundation’s organizational documents also 
reportedly require it to expend all available resources within fifty years of 
the death of its founders.
131
 Spending the founder’s money, though, need 
not mean the end of the organization. Most charities raise new money 
from donors and other sources. The Gates Foundation, for instance, 
received a massive pledge from Warren Buffett, and Buffett demanded 
that Gates spend some of the Foundation’s preexisting money each year as 
a condition of receiving his donation.
132
   
Admittedly, Buffett’s decision is unusual in that it appears that it is rare 
for the very largest foundations to receive new contributions other than 
from the founder and his or her family.
133
 Individuals who plan on making 
 
 
 127. Id. 
 128. See George G. Triantis, Organizations as Internal Capital Markets: The Legal Boundaries of 
Firms, Collateral, and Trusts in Commercial and Charitable Enterprises, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1102, 
1150 (2004). 
 129. FLEISHMAN, supra note 10, at 245–46.  
 130. HEIDI WALESON, BEYOND FIVE PERCENT: THE NEW FOUNDATION PAYOUT MENU 12–24 
(2007), available at http://community-wealth.org/content/beyond-five-percent-new-foundation-
payout-menu.  
 131. BREST & HARVEY, supra note 10, at 260. 
 132. FLEISHMAN, supra note 10, at 237. 
 133. The Foundation Center reports that the fifty largest foundations in America received about 
$9.5 billion in new gifts in 2012, against $10.7 billion in grants awarded and $209 billion in total 
assets. Fiscal Totals of the 50 Largest Foundations in the U.S. by Total Assets, 2012, FOUND. CTR., 
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very large charitable contributions often prefer to establish their own 
foundations, even when there may already be other successful grant-
making institutions pursuing the same goals.
134
   
Yet even now, when policy gives them little reason to do so, many 
foundations readily attract new gifts. In the dataset I constructed, one-third 
of private foundations receive donations in a year other than their first year 
in the dataset. Fourteen percent of firm-years see the firm take in more in 
contributions than it spends. On average, foundations replace about sixty-
two percent of all their expenses with new contributions. I find, as prior 
researchers also found, that it is mostly the largest and oldest foundations 
that tend not to receive new gifts.
135
   
To the extent that foundations don’t bring in new revenues, the reasons 
for that failure are not reasons the government should embrace. Donors 
usually explain their preference for setting up their own foundations as 
based on their desire to retain maximum control over their gifts.
136
 Part of 
it, no doubt, is also ego.
137
 Alfred Nobel established his prize to change the 
legacy attached to his name, not because he loved mankind.
138
 
Contributing money to a foundation named for someone else wouldn’t 
likely deliver the same reward. And, although donors rarely say so out 
loud, controlled private foundations offer greater tax-planning 
opportunities than contributing to someone else’s charity.139 In addition, 
managers of an existing foundation may prefer not to seek new revenues 
because, as I have mentioned, it would tend to make them more 
accountable to others.
140
 Prior studies also find evidence consistent with 
the idea that nonprofit managers find fundraising personally unpleasant.
141
   
 
 
http://data.foundationcenter.org/#/foundations/all/nationwide/top:assets/list/2012 (last visited Apr. 19, 
2016), archived at https://perma.cc/L7B4-5JJ9. 
 134. See id. 
 135. See Yoder & McAllister, supra note 82, at 65. In regression analysis, I find large and 
statistically significant negative correlations between foundation age and new giving, and between 
foundation size and new giving. Details of these regressions are available upon request.  
 136. Victoria B. Bjorklund, Giving to the Private Foundation, Donor-Advised Fund and 
Supporting Organization, CS045 A.L.I.-A.B.A. COURSE OF STUDY 431, 456, 460 (2011). 
 137. FLEISHMAN, supra note 10, at 45 (describing this as “the primary driver of the creation of 
perpetual foundations”).  
 138. RAY D. MADOFF, IMMORTALITY AND THE LAW: THE RISING POWER OF THE AMERICAN 
DEAD 87 (2010). 
 139. Wendy C. Gerzog, From the Greedy to the Needy, 87 OR. L. REV. 1133, 1169–70 (2008). For 
example, a controlled private foundation can be granted stock without concern that it will exercise its 
voting rights contrary to the interests of the controlling donor. See id. 
 140. FLEISHMAN, supra note 10, at 82–83; cf. Drennan, supra note 111, at 229 (noting that 
families may resist giving up control of foundations bearing their names). 
 141. James Andreoni & A. Abigail Payne, Is Crowding Out Due Entirely to Fundraising? 
Evidence from a Panel of Charities, 95 J. PUB. ECON. 334, 335 (2011); Cagla Okten & Burton A. 
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Still, an advocate for limited spending might say that, given these 
natural human tendencies, limited spending is the price we must pay in 
order to get the largest, very long-lived institutions. Yet none of these 
behaviors is inevitable: for instance, donors also make very large 
unrestricted gifts to universities—often with some naming rights attached, 
but not necessarily the power to rename the whole institution.
142
 Managers 
of operating charities do fundraise, even though they dislike it.
143
 Both 
parties can be incentivized to do the things that are needed to preserve 
long-lasting institutions. The question again would be whether limited 
spending is the least socially costly way of achieving the goal of 
institutional expertise. If donors are reluctant to give to someone else’s 
foundation, why not change tax rules to encourage additional giving? Or, 
if the problem is managers, perhaps imposing a higher mandatory payout 
rate would motivate managers who want to retain their jobs to work harder 
to bring in new money.  
I also agree with Mark Hall and John Colombo’s argument that the 
ability to attract new donations is an important signal of an organization’s 
quality.
144
 If individual donors no longer want to support the mission of a 
foundation, what does that say about how well-spent the government’s 
subsidy dollars are? Hall and Colombo’s critique is especially trenchant 
for large foundations, which long have been criticized for being insular 
vehicles by which the super-rich can shape society.
145
   
Scholarly work in the cognitive psychology of group decision making 
also suggests that policy often is best made in settings where decision 
makers know that there will be opportunities for those with differing 
points of view to probe and challenge.
146
 In other words, I question 
 
 
Weisbrod, Determinants of Donations in Private Nonprofit Markets, 75 J. PUB. ECON. 255, 267 
(2000). 
 142. See Brody, supra note 10, at 884; Hansmann, supra note 10, at 8. 
 143. See Andreoni & Payne, supra note 141, at 335. 
 144. Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The Donative Theory of the Charitable Tax Exemption, 
52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1379, 1450–51 (1991); see also Tax Reform Act of 1969, 1969-3 C.B. 464 (justifying 
statutory limits on nonprofit borrowing on the ground that nonprofits could otherwise expand without 
the need for additional donations); Irvin, supra note 10, at 449; see also generally S. REP. NO. 91–552 
(1969). 
 145. Lester M. Salamon, Partners in Public Service: The Scope and Theory of Government-
Nonprofit Relations, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 99, 112 (Walter W. Powell 
ed., 1987). 
 146. CARLOS SANTIAGO NINO, THE CONSTITUTION OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 117–28 
(1996); Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 105–
08 (2000). This could also be spun as a negative feature of new donations, however. By introducing 
new points of view, the charity may cause donors to worry that other donors will act at cross-purposes 
to their own, introducing cross-monitoring costs. See Triantis, supra note 128, at 1147–48. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss5/5
  
 
 
 
 
2016] PAY IT FORWARD? 1175 
 
 
 
 
whether an organization that need never raise new money really can 
achieve the kind of institutional expertise and openness to new ideas 
championed by Professors Brest and Fleishman. In contrast, rules that 
incentivize the organization to demonstrate the worth of its mission to 
outsiders help to open doors, or at least windows, into the closed interiors 
of philanthropic power.  
In sum, to the extent that the institutional expertise arguments have any 
power, it is only with respect to a small subset of restricted-spending 
organizations. Only those large, old, and vibrant enough to have developed 
significant irreplaceable human capital, or capable of carrying out 
extensive policy experimentation, can claim the benefit at all. And only 
those organizations seem to need restricted spending to protect their 
extended lives; other philanthropies have little trouble raising new money.  
3. Real Option Value of Waiting 
A last argument one sometimes reads from restricted-spending 
advocates is that a foundation’s best project is not always available 
immediately.
147
 For instance, the Gates Foundation wants to combat 
malaria. Should it put all its billions into the first malaria vaccine that 
comes along? Or should it try to develop several potential solutions, 
saving its biggest expenditures for the one that proves most promising? 
This second route has an intuitive appeal, and the underlying insight is 
sometimes called “real option value.”148 By waiting, we get more 
information about the world, and that can allow us to make better 
choices.
149
   
Economic models of real options suggest that waiting isn’t an 
unmitigated good.
150
 Instead, there is an optimal balance between waiting 
and acting.
151
 Even for actors with theoretically infinite lives, waiting can 
mean missing out on opportunities that might have turned out to be the 
best choice.
152
 At some point, Gates has to get behind one of its vaccine 
manufacturers, before they all go out of business. Real option theory may 
 
 
 147. Irvin, supra note 10, at 449–50; Deep & Frumkin, supra note 10, at 12–13. 
 148. BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 50, at 619; Alexander J. Triantis & James E. Hodder, 
Valuing Flexibility as a Complex Option, 45 J. FIN. 549, 549–50 (1990). 
 149. BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 50, at 625. Relatedly, foundations may serve as 
intermediaries whose greater capacity to investigate and verify service organizations makes them 
valuable sources of seed capital. Triantis, supra note 128, at 1160. But this, too, is a story in which, 
while saving is useful, the foundation must constantly spend to make the savings worthwhile. 
 150. BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 50, at 625–28. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
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justify some degree of savings, but in the end it’s a theory of action, not 
inaction.  
Real options also don’t offer much support for awarding subsidies to 
donors at the time of their gift, rather than the time the foundation spends 
the contribution. What value is created for society by the Gates 
Foundation’s holding Bill Gates’s money as it searches for the best ways 
to spend it? What difference would it make if Gates himself held the bulk 
of the funds, then contributed the rest when the Foundation informed him 
it had found the right target? If anything, placing the money in the 
Foundation’s hands shifts the administrative costs of investing the funds to 
the Foundation, and introduces the kind of agency costs I discussed in Part 
III.
153
     
B. New Arguments for Restricted Spending 
In addition to the possibilities other commentators have raised, I want 
to raise some additional potential benefits from the accumulation of wealth 
by philanthropic organizations. In earlier theoretical work, I argued that 
the best justification for subsidies for the charitable sector may be the 
sector’s potential to achieve what local governments cannot: spend during 
times of acute need, compete effectively with the federal government, and 
conduct guided policy experiments, among other goals.
154
 Each of these 
three achievements likely requires some buildup of charitable assets over 
time. I’ll now claim, however, that rather than prescribing accumulation of 
unlimited wealth over endless periods of time by private foundations, 
these policies generally weigh in favor of limited savings, call for 
occasional aggressive spending, and may make more sense for operating 
charities than private foundations. 
As a prelude to this analysis, I should mention that the traditional 
rationale for government support of charities is that charity is basically a 
delivery vehicle for positive externality goods that neither government nor 
market would otherwise provide.
155
 So, for example, charity can pursue 
goals that could not command a majority of voters. In this Subpart, I will 
 
 
 153. Perhaps the firm can do slightly better long-range planning when it has actual title to the 
donation, rather than just a pledge by Gates to commit the money in the future. But that seems a fairly 
slender benefit. 
 154. Galle, supra note 105, at 835–40. 
 155. Burton A. Weisbrod, Toward a Theory of the Voluntary Non-Profit Sector in a Three-Sector 
Economy, in ALTRUISM, MORALITY, AND ECONOMIC THEORY 171, 175–83 (Edmund S. Phelps ed., 
1975); Mark P. Gergen, The Case for a Charitable Contributions Deduction, 74 VA. L. REV. 1393, 
1399 (1988). 
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build on some additional examples of instances in which charities can 
succeed while governments fail.  
1. Crisis Spending   
One key example where governments predictably fail is crisis 
spending.
156
 Private citizens should want to buy insurance or build up a 
buffer stock of savings against the possibility of bad times, such as natural 
disasters or recessions.
157
 But because of asymmetric information between 
individuals and insurers, markets for these kinds of insurance are 
overpriced, unavailable, or otherwise “incomplete,” which is a nice way of 
saying that they fail.
158
 Governments can and often should step in to 
provide fallback social insurance, whether in the form of disaster 
insurance, unemployment insurance, or fiscal stimulus (that is, extra 
spending or tax cuts) during recessions.
159
 However, for a variety of 
reasons I have sketched in earlier work, government—especially state and 
local government—also performs poorly during recessions.160 Historically, 
US states have tended to cut spending and raise taxes during recessions, 
which is the exact opposite of what they should be doing.
161
 Federal relief 
arrives more consistently, but often at the wrong times and aimed at the 
wrong people.
162
 
Nonprofits can and should step in to fill this gap, but they face some 
practical obstacles in doing so. Donations to charity fall during 
recessions.
163
 Logically, donors are more likely to give when they have 
more available, and recessions can squeeze even the most generous. 
Wealthy individuals with no credit constraints, however, should be 
indifferent to current market fluctuations: they should anticipate that 
 
 
 156. Galle, supra note 105, at 823–24. 
 157. See Martin Feldstein, Rethinking Social Insurance, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 2–3 (2005).  
 158. Id. at 4. 
 159. As with any insurance, government social insurance can give rise to bad incentives on the 
part of those who are insured, often called “moral hazard.” Good social insurance programs will 
include design features that balance the cost of moral hazard against the benefits of helping citizens 
deal with risk.  
 160. Brian Galle & Jonathan Klick, Recessions and the Social Safety Net: The Alternative 
Minimum Tax as a Countercyclical Fiscal Stabilizer, 63 STAN. L. REV. 187, 195–210 (2010). 
 161. Jonathan Rodden & Erik Wibbels, Fiscal Decentralization and the Business Cycle: An 
Empirical Study of Seven Federations, 22 ECON. & POL. 37, 37 (2010); David A. Super, Rethinking 
Fiscal Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2544, 2609–10 (2005).  
 162. Super, supra note 161, at 2608. Danshera Cords provides a similar account of charitable 
efforts in relief of natural disasters. Danshera Cords, Charity Begins at Home? An Exploration of the 
Systemic Distortions Resulting from Post-Disaster Giving Incentives, 44 RUTGERS L.J. 213, 234–36 
(2014). 
 163. Irvin, supra note 10, at 450.  
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markets will rebound, and donate out of future wealth.
164
 That they seem 
not to fully do so tells us that the dip in giving may also be attributable to 
some other factor, such as tax policy.  
Tax incentives for giving are also weaker during recessions. As current 
incomes fall, so do marginal tax rates, reducing the size of the 
government’s matching grant.165 Further, recall that a major tax advantage 
for donations of securities is that they allow the donor to deduct the full 
value of the security, without paying tax on the gains. During recessions, 
when the stock market is weaker, the securities held by potential donors 
are usually worth less, making both of these tax incentives less valuable.
166
   
Foundations might therefore serve as private piggy banks for the 
charity world. Governments would like to save for future crises, but 
struggle to do so in the face of political preferences for the present. Tax 
subsidies for foundations would be the equivalent of a government 
contract with private parties to save in government’s stead.  
Even so, private foundation savings may not contribute much to the 
problem of crisis spending. Instead of paying for foundation savings, 
government could find ways of encouraging greater donations during 
times of need, as it did following Hurricane Katrina and other recent 
disasters.
167
 That would tend to reduce the need for charities to build up 
funds in anticipation of crises. On the other hand, it might be difficult for 
operating charities to absorb huge influxes of new funds over short 
periods.
168
 But that still doesn’t necessarily support foundation savings 
since new funds would be hard to absorb, whatever their source. It might 
be better for the operating charities to decide for themselves when to save 
and when to spend; for then such charities might use excess funds during 
non-crisis times to build infrastructure and response capabilities.  
Another difficulty with offering more generous subsidies for new 
donations in times of need is that donor responses to crises can also be 
somewhat inefficient, with gifts flowing to areas that get more press 
coverage, rather than those that may offer the greatest social benefit.
169
 On 
 
 
 164. See Jon Bakija & Bradley T. Heim, How Does Charitable Giving Respond to Incentives and 
Income? New Estimates from Panel Data, 64 NAT’L TAX J. 615, 620 (2011). 
 165. Triantis, supra note 128, at 1146. 
 166. See Bakija & Heim, supra note 164, at 619. 
 167. See Ellen P. Aprill & Richard Schmalbeck, Post-Disaster Tax Legislation: A Series of 
Unfortunate Events, 56 DUKE L.J. 51, 53–56 (2006). 
 168. Deep & Frumkin, supra note 10, at 13. 
 169. Cords, supra note 162, at 249. 
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that front, at least, foundations can help by using more rigorous methods 
for directing funds.
170
   
Whatever the theoretical case for private foundation savings as a cure 
for crisis, in the real world, private foundations don’t seem to pursue that 
goal. Foundation spending is flat or lower during recessions.
171
 As a result, 
it is difficult to justify current foundation limited-spending policies on the 
basis that these policies allow for greater spending when economic need is 
greatest. In Part V, I discuss some possible ways in which a limited-
spending rule could be reshaped to better fit with this goal.  
2. A Federal Alternative 
A second instance where federated government often fails to produce a 
diverse array of policy choices for citizens is in the delivery of public 
goods whose benefits are spread relatively thinly across many different 
states.
172
 When benefits spill over in this way, it is rational for each state 
and local government to aim to free ride on the efforts of others, and 
assembling an inter-jurisdictional special government entity to deal with 
the problem is costly and politically fraught.
173
 As a result, the national 
government rarely has direct state competitors in important policy areas 
such as international aid, wildlife and natural resource conservation, basic 
science funding, and the like.
174
 Charities offer the public an alternative to 
exclusive reliance on their national elected officials, and by providing 
competition or a yardstick for comparison can help to force those officials 
to perform better.
175
   
We live in a big country, though, with big problems. The federal 
alternative story may require similarly large stores of charitable resources. 
Perhaps to be effective at the regional or national level, the charitable 
sector must build a deep pool of funds.
176
 
 
 
 170. Foundations might also be able to respond more quickly than individual donors. See Triantis, 
supra note 128, at 1147. 
 171. Irvin, supra note 10, at 450–51. I also perform regression analysis, using the data set 
described in the Appendix, to determine whether foundations increase spending when their home 
states are suffering through recessionary periods. I find a slight but statistically significant negative 
effect of recessions on foundation spending. Full regression results are available on request. 
 172. Galle, supra note 105, at 822–25. 
 173. Id. at 823. 
 174. Id. at 810. 
 175. Id. at 822–23. 
 176. Cf. FLEISHMAN, supra note 10, at 247 (arguing that perpetual foundations are better able to 
“stand up” to government because they can use “slow, steady pressure”); Marsh, supra note 17, at 169 
(suggesting that foundations can “tackle large community projects” because they are able to 
“concentrate capital”). 
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As with crisis spending, it isn’t clear that foundation savings are the 
best source of savings for this kind of future need. As national aggregator 
organizations such as the United Way show, the resources to achieve 
national influence need not come from one donor, whose seed money must 
then snowball over time. Put another way, the national influence story 
doesn’t clearly establish whether any particular donation should be used 
for one large project or instead for a steady stream of small ones. 
Further, operating charities, too, can build their resources to the point 
where they can be effective across a wide geographic area. Operating 
charities might also be perfectly effective if there are many small 
organizations that in the aggregate are able to get things done. That is 
largely the model of US international aid organizations; basic science, 
similarly, can be funded a handful of labs at a time.
177
 Or national 
influence service organizations could be funded with an ongoing, rolling 
stream of contributions from individual donors and moderate-sized 
foundations. On the other hand, having centralized funding to guide and 
evaluate new projects is likely important to their ultimate success.  
Nor does the need for large organizations justify government support 
for gifts with indefinite or inflexible restricted-spending provisions. It may 
take time to build a firm to the point where it can meaningfully pursue 
nationwide projects. But at some point the firm reaches that scale. Under a 
restricted-spending rule, the time it takes the firm to achieve the 
appropriate scale for a national-level project is far longer: because the firm 
is bound to spending only a small fraction of its assets each year, it must 
wait until its assets grow to something like twenty times the annual 
spending it will need.
178
 In contrast, a firm that was free to spend, say, 
twenty percent of its assets in a year could launch its project far sooner.
179
   
 
 
 177. See Jon Bennett, Introduction: Recent Trends in Relief Aid: Structural Crisis and the Quest 
for a New Consensus, in MEETING NEEDS: NGO COORDINATION IN PRACTICE xi–xxi (Jon Bennett ed., 
2013) (summarizing studies of how NGOs deliver international aid). 
 178. Cf. FLEISHMAN, supra note 10, at 243 (explaining how spending limits postpone effective 
spending). 
 179. For example, suppose the foundation begins with a $10 million bequest and wants to be able 
to fund a $20 million project. Under a 5% payout limit, the foundation must have a $400 million 
endowment before it can spend that much. A firm that can spend up to 20% of its assets need only 
accumulate $100 million. How long will it take, assuming a 10% rate of return, to reach those 
numbers? The standard formula is n = 
log(𝐹𝑉)− log (𝑃𝑉)
log (1+𝑖)
. Plugging our made-up values into this formula, 
it would take about 38.7 years to reach $400 million, but only 24.2 years to reach $100 million. The 
example simplifies the real world a bit, because foundations with limited payouts may be able to skip 
payout years and build up to a larger one-year expenditure. This would complicate our math, but the 
upshot—that the less restricted firm could hit its target much sooner—would remain the same.  
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In short, a firm with national ambitions must be free to spend in large 
chunks at times when an opportunity to effect broad change arises. While 
foundations are a vital alternative to government, there is little reason to 
believe that ever greater wealth accumulation is necessary for, or even 
consistent with, that goal.  
C. A Review  
Let’s step back for a moment to assess where the argument so far has 
taken us. As I’ve framed it, the basic question is whether subsidizing 
restricted-spending charity is a better use of the government’s resources 
than other alternatives. One alternative would be for the government to 
invest its money, and then later devote the resulting payoff to charity or 
some other worthwhile project. Another would be to fund charities that 
will spend the subsidy relatively quickly.  
While I cannot put precise numbers on any of the three options, the 
analysis so far suggests that restricted spending, except within certain 
limits, usually will have less value than either of the other choices. For 
instance, compare restricted spending with government savings. Both 
government and foundations will likely earn similar investment returns. 
The problem is that the utility payoff from foundation spending diminishes 
over time, as the usefulness of each dollar declines with the expanding 
foundation sector, and agency and information costs eat away at the 
sector’s advantages. Or compare restricted-spending charity with funding 
operating charities that will quickly spend the funds. Here, the unrestricted 
alternative’s advantages are that current programs generate learning 
externalities for present and future charity and that a dollar spent now, 
when the world is needier, pays more than a dollar spent in the future.  
As Part IV has shown, there are counterarguments for restricted-
spending policies, but those arguments seem limited in scope. Foundations 
with a pool of assets can serve important roles, but those roles often 
demand flexibility to spend in times of great need or great opportunity. 
And, by fundraising, foundations can serve that role without the need for 
preserving the perpetual existence of any particular donor’s contribution. 
At best, the argument for restricted-spending subsidies would be an 
argument that foundations should not have to attract new donors, but if 
anything the opposite would seem to be true.  
What, then, is to be done?  
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V. POLICY IMPLICATIONS: PAYOUT RULES AND BEYOND 
Let’s now turn from theory to policy. So far, my argument is that long-
term restricted spending is socially costly and, at a minimum, should 
probably not be subsidized. However, as I will explain in Subpart V.A, 
simply eliminating existing federal subsidies for restricted-spending 
foundations is problematic. I’ll therefore consider a series of possible 
alternative approaches to at least mitigate the worst aspects of restricted 
spending in private foundations and to shape restricted-spending policies 
to more closely resemble their theoretical justifications. In other words, in 
Parts V.B through V.E, I work through ways to encourage foundations to 
spend money faster and also to spend more intensively during times of 
great need. Part V.F will then move on to focus on restricted spending in a 
popular new substitute for private foundations, the so-called donor-advised 
fund. Finally, Part V.G looks at recently adopted state laws that encourage 
restricted spending. I report, for the first time, evidence of the impact these 
laws have had on foundation policy—to preview, they have indeed 
reduced spending by some measures—and then make a case for their 
outright repeal.  
A. Existing Subsidies Are Hard to Repeal 
Part I sketched the two main ways in which federal tax policy is 
currently underwriting restricted spending. First, donors receive a 
deduction at the time of their contribution to a foundation, irrespective of 
when the foundation spends that money. Second, the investment returns 
the foundation earns on that money are tax-free, so that it is tax-
advantaged to have the foundation hold profitable assets over time.  
While one approach to fixing the restricted-spending problem would be 
to just repeal or greatly limit these tax advantages,
180
 full repeal seems 
impractical, at least for the immediate deduction. For example, suppose 
that Congress were to defer a donor’s deduction or a portion of it until the 
donated funds were actually expended by the foundation.
181
 Because 
money is fungible, such a rule would not necessarily increase the amount 
of money actually appropriated each year by foundations, at least at 
organizations that borrow, have received multiple gifts, or have other 
 
 
 180. See Brody, supra note 10, at 945 (noting this possibility). 
 181. See Gerzog, supra note 139, at 1180; Halperin, supra note 30; Madoff, supra note 30, at 974. 
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sources of revenue.
182
 The Foundation might spend more of Bill Gates’s 
money now, but reduce the money it was spending out of its small donor 
fund or its special event revenues. Non-donative, non-investment revenues 
are empirically significant. For instance, in my sample, “other” income 
accounts for about 4% of total foundation inflows.
183
   
Death, too, complicates any repeal plan. Repeal would put pressure on 
foundations to spend earlier so that donors could claim their deductions 
sooner. But once a taxpayer no longer has a stream of income against 
which to claim her deductions—for instance, because she’s deceased—the 
foundation no longer would have any incentive to accelerate payouts. 
Delaying the deduction would also be complex to implement for bequests. 
Presumably, large estates would be denied a full deduction against the 
estate tax in the year of death,
184
 but then entitled to partial refunds over 
time as the bequest is spent down by the donee organization. This could 
entail burdensome record-keeping over many years, as well as potential 
legal uncertainty about how to divide the refunds among various heirs.  
Rules applicable to new donations also would not affect any restricted-
spending rules that now bind the nearly one trillion dollars in existing 
private foundation wealth.
185
 Deductions to organizations that do not pay 
out old wealth could be curtailed, but that would just encourage donors to 
form new foundations, leaving old money still subject to old rules.  
While the administrative obstacles to taxing foundation investment 
earnings are not as substantial, there may be economic side-effects that 
make that option undesirable. Current law already imposes a small tax of 
1% to 2%, as I will detail a bit more in Part IV.C, so there would be little 
direct administrative burden from simply increasing the rate.
186
 But it is far 
from clear that it would be optimal to impose the same tax on charitable 
investments as other businesses or individual investors face. A tax on 
foundation investment assets could encourage spending, but in some 
situations could also discourage it, and would introduce other changes in 
managers’ behavior as well. The optimal tax rate would represent a 
balance between these factors. In order to explain the tradeoffs fully, I will 
first have to explore some other legal rules that currently govern 
 
 
 182. See Halperin, supra note 30 (noting this problem with a rule requiring spending out of 
endowment). 
 183. See infra tbl.A.1. 
 184. See I.R.C. § 2055 (2014). 
 185. See Aggregate Fiscal Data of Foundations in the U.S., 2012, supra note 8. 
 186. I.R.C. § 4940(a) (2014). A potential complication, as Dan Halperin notes, is that if the tax 
were large enough Congress would likely have to also change some of the rules for taxes on unrelated 
business income. Halperin, supra note 26, at 306. 
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foundation payout, and so I will defer a complete discussion until Part 
V.C. For now, it is enough to say that it is unlikely government would 
want to fully repeal foundations’ exemption for investment income. 
B. Time-Neutral Contribution Deductions 
If outright repeal of foundations’ tax advantages is not an attractive 
policy option, what other choices are there? One option would be to target 
donor incentives. We have seen that a key flaw in the current system is 
that it incentivizes donors to prefer restricted spending, because restricted 
spending increases the total subsidy available from the government.
187
 In 
general, in a well-functioning market we should expect private actors to 
make decisions that maximize their own welfare.
188
 Government should 
not distort private choices unless the market “fails” or otherwise goes 
wrong.
189
 Since there is no reason to believe that firms would otherwise 
spend faster than society would prefer, the tax system should strive to be 
neutral about the timing of expenditures. If we cannot readily remove the 
tax subsidy for restricted spending available to firms, we should alter 
donor incentives to leave the system neutral overall.
190
   
Prior commentators have proposed fully disallowing any deduction for 
permanently restricted gifts (albeit in the university, not private 
foundation, context), but Congress likely need not go that far.
191
 An 
alternative approach would be to reduce the value of a charitable 
 
 
 187. It might be argued that when foundations are considered in the larger context of the income 
tax as a whole, the exemption of their investment income in fact is “neutral.” The argument would be 
that an income tax creates a substitution effect in favor of faster consumption, because it reduces the 
returns to savings. See GRUBER, supra note 60, at 650 (modeling effect of an income tax on savings). 
The tax exemption for restricted spending firms then restores donors to indifference between spending 
money on charity now or spending it later. But this argument goes astray because most other savings 
options in our tax system remain subject to tax. Therefore, the exemption still distorts the donor’s 
choice about whether to place money in a restricted-spending vehicle or to keep or spend it elsewhere. 
 188. See id. at 3. 
 189. Id.  
 190. I should note that existing law already mildly penalizes donations to private foundations, 
such as through a modestly lower cap on annual giving and reduced benefits for in-kind gifts other 
than publicly traded stock. I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(D), (e)(1)(B) (2014). But these rules apply regardless of 
how fast or slow the organization spends.  
 191. Herwig Schlunk, An Argument for the Repeal of Tax Preferences for Educational 
Endowments 22 (Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch. Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 09-37, 2009); 
Waldeck, supra note 10, at 1818; see also MOLLY F. SHERLOCK ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
R44293, COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ENDOWMENTS: OVERVIEW AND TAX POLICY OPTIONS 19 (2015) 
(citing Examining the Rising Costs of Higher Education: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways and 
Means Subcomm. on Oversight, 114th Cong. (2015) (testimony of Brian Galle, Professor of Law, 
Georgetown University Law Center), available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/event/39840295/) 
(examining the possibility of reducing the value of the deduction for restricted gifts).  
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contribution deduction by the amount of any tax benefits that derive from 
restricted spending. This calculation would not be an exact science. The 
general idea, though, would be to make some reasonable estimates about 
the value of the perpetual exemption from tax on investment earnings, 
discount that total to present value, and subtract the result from the donor’s 
initial deduction. As Herwig Schlunk has shown, the exact value depends 
on what we expect the foundation’s average rate of pre-tax returns will 
be.
192
 Congress or Treasury would have to make an educated guess about 
that number and could adjust it periodically. 
To illustrate, suppose that in year one donor A makes a restricted gift 
of $1 million to Foundation Z. The gift is subject to a restriction that 
Foundation Z maintain the real value of the gift in perpetuity. Let us 
assume that the discounted present value of the tax benefits from 
exempting an infinite series of Foundation Z’s resulting investment returns 
converges to $100,000. Donor A would reduce her charitable contribution 
deduction in year one from $1 million to $900,000.  
Admittedly, this proposal has some important limitations. Like outright 
repeal of existing time preferences, it would not affect any assets already 
under management by philanthropic organizations. Further, some donors 
may be relatively indifferent to the charitable contribution deduction. The 
tax rules facing many entrepreneurs are already so favorable that they have 
relatively little need for yet another means of reducing their income.
193
 
Other donors, such as the Gateses, may have such massive deductions 
relative to income that they already will be unable to use more than a 
fraction of their income tax deduction.
194
  
C. Section 4942: Federally Required Payouts 
In light of these obstacles, and the likely political difficulty in changing 
the rules for charitable contributions, it is worth examining other options 
as well. Another obvious possibility, which Congress already is employing 
to a limited extent, is to require that foundations loosen the knots of 
 
 
 192. Schlunk, supra note 191, at 8–9. 
 193. David J. Herzig, Why We Should Stop Slamming Mark Zuckerberg and Priscilla Chan’s 
Philanthropic Plans, WASH. POST (Dec. 9, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-
faith/wp/2015/12/09/why-we-should-stop-slamming-mark-zuckerberg-and-priscilla-chans-phil anthropic-
plans/. 
 194. Estate-planning techniques could potentially substitute for the lost value of the charitable 
contribution deduction from the estate tax, although these techniques may be less effective than is 
commonly assumed. Paul L. Caron & James R. Repetti, The Estate Tax Non-Gap: Why Repeal a 
“Voluntary” Tax?, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 153, 158–68 (2009). 
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restricted-spending rules. That is, Congress can set a payout rate—a 
minimum amount of annual spending for foundations each year. Under 
current law, organizations that are categorized as private foundations for 
tax law purposes must annually spend at least 5% of the net investment 
assets they held at the end of the previous year.
195
 Qualifying expenditures 
include grant distributions to operating charities, as well as salary and 
other administrative costs.
196
 Private foundations that can show they are 
saving up for a large future expenditure can get a temporary waiver of the 
spending requirement.
197
   
The payout rate should be much higher. When Congress adopted the 
current rule in 1981, its explanation was that 5% is the maximum 
sustainable payout.
198
 Foundation advocates presented Congress with the 
results of studies suggesting that the real rate of return on foundation 
assets averages about 5%.
199
 Any higher and foundation assets would tend 
to diminish over time, assuming no new contributions. I will now argue, 
though, that both these assumptions are flawed: real rates of return are 
much higher than 5%, and new contributions largely offset expenditures. 
1. New Data on Real Rates of Return 
Even accepting the premise that foundations should be able to sustain 
themselves indefinitely without attracting new donors, the best evidence 
actually demonstrates that average sustainable payout rates are 
considerably higher than 5%. Since in my view prior studies all have 
significant flaws, I present new data drawn from a large sample of 
foundations.  
First, though, I should describe the prior studies and their problems. 
One early set of studies was built around simulations.
200
 The authors 
looked at some basic surveys of how foundations allocate their assets 
between stocks and bonds.
201
 Using average market performance for those 
two categories, they computed the expected returns for typical foundation 
 
 
 195. I.R.C. § 4942(a), (e) (2014). 
 196. Id. § 4942(g)(1)(A). 
 197. Id. § 4942(g)(2). 
 198. C. Eugene Steuerle, Distribution Requirements for Foundations, 70 PROC. ANN. CONF. ON 
TAX’N 423, 424 (1977). 
 199. Id. 
 200. DEMARCHE ASSOCS., INC., PAYOUT POLICIES AND INVESTMENT PLANNING FOR 
FOUNDATIONS: A STRUCTURE FOR DETERMINING A FOUNDATION’S ASSET MIX (1990). Salamon, The 
Process, supra note 86, at 119, summarizes several other early simulation results. 
 201. DEMARCHE ASSOCS., INC., supra note 200. 
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asset allocations.
202
 Most of these studies estimated real rates of return—
that is, profits net of inflation—of between 5% and 6%.203 
Simulated data based on market averages don’t provide a good picture 
of real foundation returns. Other studies have found that some nonprofits 
can “dramatically outperform market indices,”204 and this result should not 
be surprising. Foundations have a number of tax and other advantages 
over other investors
205
 and may have investment opportunities and revenue 
sources other than stocks and bonds.
206
 
The more convincing studies look to the actual investment earnings 
reported by real foundations on their tax returns. In 1981, the Michigan 
Council on Foundations, a trade group that represents foundation interests, 
hired the University of Michigan School of Business to examine the 
historic investment returns at a handful of Michigan foundations.
207
 Since 
then, the study was turned over to Cambridge Associates LLC (“CAI”), a 
financial consultant, which produced updates in 2000, 2004, and 2013.
208
 
Each time, CAI has concluded that “data from . . . [t]he actual . . . 
experience of a sample of Michigan foundations [with diversified 
portfolios] do[] not support a [payout] rate higher than 5%.”209       
One issue with the CAI study is that it examines not a random sample 
of foundations, but instead a group of foundations that apparently 
voluntarily agreed to participate.
210
 Most of the participating entities, 
 
 
 202. Id.  
 203. E.g., id. However, an IRS simulation for the years 1979 to 1982 projected a rate of 8.5%, and 
that number did not even include unrealized appreciation. MARGARET RILEY, INTERNAL REVENUE 
SERV., PRIVATE FOUNDATION INFORMATION RETURNS, 1982, at 7 (1985), available at http://www.irs. 
gov/pub/irs-soi/82pfinforeturns.pdf. 
 204. Garth Heutel & Richard Zeckhauser, The Investment Returns of Nonprofit Organizations, 
Part I: Tales from 990 Forms, 25 NONPROFIT MGMT. & LEADERSHIP 41, 45 (2014). 
 205. Taxable investors are more reluctant to shift investments because selling most assets triggers 
a tax on any investment gains in that asset. Therefore, we should expect nonprofits to be able to more 
actively churn their portfolios. Halperin, supra note 26, at 309. At the same time, because of its long 
time horizon, the foundation typically has the luxury of holding relatively illiquid assets, which can 
provide for a greater return. See Lester M. Salamon, Foundations as Investment Managers Part II: The 
Performance, 3 NONPROFIT MGMT. & LEADERSHIP 239, 244 (1993) [hereinafter Salamon, The 
Performance] (reporting that “[f]oundations with longer time horizons tended to perform better”). 
Foundations have opportunities for tax arbitrage; to take the simplest example, a foundation can hold 
taxable bonds, rather than tax-exempt bonds, and earn the higher rate of return that taxable bonds 
carry. See John M. R. Chalmers, Default Risk Cannot Explain the Muni Puzzle: Evidence from 
Municipal Bonds That Are Secured by U.S. Treasury Obligations, 11 REV. FIN. STUD. 281, 284–88 
(1998) (summarizing evidence on the premium for taxable bonds).  
 206. See infra tbl.A.1. 
 207. CAMBRIDGE ASSOCS., INC., SUSTAINABLE PAYOUT FOR FOUNDATIONS, at iii (2000).  
 208. CAMBRIDGE ASSOCS. LLC, SUSTAINABLE PAYOUT FOR FOUNDATIONS: 2013 UPDATE STUDY 
1–2 (2013) [hereinafter CAMBRIDGE ASSOCS. LLC, UPDATE]. 
 209. Id. at 1. 
 210. See CAMBRIDGE ASSOCS., INC., supra note 207, at 1–2. 
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furthermore, were in Michigan.
211
 We might expect that a foundation that 
agrees to open its books to close scrutiny by outsiders would be atypical in 
some ways. For example, if foundations with good or bad results were 
more likely to be included in the sample group, that could produce results 
that are not representative of the foundation population as a whole. In any 
event, given the small size of the study—fewer than 50 firms—its results 
may be unrepresentative simply by random chance.  
The nonprofit scholar Lester Salamon took a more convincing 
approach.
212
 Salamon drew a random sample of more than 1000 
foundation tax returns, sent them a mail survey, and then examined more 
closely the 350 or so that responded.
213
 Once more, we don’t know 
whether the firms that responded were representative of the sector as a 
whole, but at least Salamon was looking at about seven times as many 
firms. On the other hand, he was only able to study seven years of data, 
from 1979 to 1986.
214
 Over that stretch, Salamon reports that “[a]fter 
adjusting for inflation, the rate of return on foundation assets was close to 
[eleven] percent a year.”215   
In an attempt to get a truly representative picture of foundation 
performance, I replicate the CAI methodology in a large, randomized 
sample of private foundations with 25 years of data. Again, I detail the 
construction of the sample and my calculations in the Appendix. 
I find an average compound return a bit higher than the CAI results. 
The mean nominal rate of return is 12.69%. The weighted median is 
8.52%.
216
 These returns are good but not extraordinary; many simple 
investment portfolios could have achieved returns in excess of 11% over 
the same period.
217
   
Obviously, this number is much higher than the 5% figure estimated by 
CAI. In fact, though, the nominal rates of return I find—that is, the returns 
 
 
 211. See id. at 23. CAI’s 2013 update reportedly adds “data from a national aggregate of private 
foundations obtained from the IRS,” without detailing the methodology for that analysis. CAMBRIDGE 
ASSOCS. LLC, UPDATE, supra note 208, at 4. A footnote to the update appears to imply that the report 
relied on IRS aggregate data, id. at 4 n.3, suggesting that the report does not winsorize to exclude 
extreme outliers.  
 212. Salamon, The Performance, supra note 205, at 241–42. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. at 243. An IRS study of 1 year of data also found returns of 12.4%. Margaret Riley, 
Private Foundation Returns, 1985, in INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., SOI BULLETIN: SUMMER 1989, at 
27, 31 (1989). In a summary table, Yoder and McAllister report mean net investment income, 
exclusive of asset appreciation, of 9.9% for the period 1995 through 2007. Yoder & McAllister, supra 
note 82, at 53, 58.  
 216. The unweighted but winsorized mean is 8.11%, with a median of 6.87%.  
 217. CAMBRIDGE ASSOCS., INC., supra note 207, at 7. 
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before inflation—are quite close to the CAI figures. For example, CAI’s 
2000 report finds nominal rates of between 11.04% and 12.48%.
218
 CAI 
apparently reaches its much lower figure by discounting nominal returns 
by a rate of inflation of between 5% and 6%.
219
   
To provide a full apples-to-apples comparison, I also attempt to 
estimate a real (i.e., net of inflation) rate of return. I cannot be certain that 
I am fully replicating CAI’s method, however, because CAI does not 
disclose how they calculated their inflation rate, except to state that their 
figure relies on the “CPI deflator.”220 
I emphasize the choice of inflation methods because the average 
inflation rates in my data are much lower than the 5% to 6% range CAI 
assumes in its 2000 report.
221
 Depending on which measure of inflation I 
employ, I get an average inflation rate of between 2.5% and 3.3%. Readers 
interested in inflation measures can find more detail in the Appendix. 
After accounting for inflation, firms still achieve an average rate of 
return of between 9.34% and 10.11%. The median real compound return is 
4.84% to 5.65%. Table 1 summarizes the results. 
TABLE 1: REAL RATES OF RETURN AT A SAMPLE OF PRIVATE 
FOUNDATIONS USING THREE DIFFERENT MEASURES OF INFLATION,  
1985 TO 2011 
 CPI-U PCE GDP Deflator 
Mean 9.34% 10.05% 10.11% 
Median 4.84% 5.59% 5.65% 
Notes: Source: IRS PF-SOI 2011 Cumulative File. Number of firms: 21,486. Data are winsorized and 
weighted by average firm assets. 
In short, I find that even when accounting for inflation, we should 
expect that the average dollar invested in a private foundation will earn a 
return of at least 9%. That number, of course, is considerably higher than 
the current 5% minimum payout required under federal law. The 5% 
figure was defended, historically, as the maximum that foundations could 
 
 
 218. Id. at 7, 25. The 2013 update claims that both Michigan and “national” nominal returns are 
lower, at about 9.5%. CAMBRIDGE ASSOCS. LLC, UPDATE, supra note 208, at 4. Notably, the data for 
the update end in 2009, id., which of course was a historically poor year for investment assets.  
 219. CAMBRIDGE ASSOCS., INC., supra note 207, at 7.  
 220. Id. at 25. I submitted a working draft of this paper to CAI for their comment, but they did not 
respond, despite initially indicating that they would do so. 
 221. The 2013 Update appears to apply an inflation discount of about 3%. CAMBRIDGE ASSOCS. 
LLC, UPDATE, supra note 208, at 4. 
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spend and still be able to sustain their endowment.
222
 My results suggest 
that sustainable spending could exceed 5% by a considerable margin.  
It might be argued that, while the mean rates of return are substantial, 
median rates fall around the traditional 5% figure. About half of 
foundations, mostly quite small ones, cannot sustainably spend 5%.  
I would argue in response that the mean returns are much more 
important for policy purposes. For one, we’ve seen that most of the 
arguments for restricted spending apply to the foundation sector as a 
whole, not any given firm. The mean rate of return is the number that 
would preserve the total amount of funds available across all firms and 
time periods. Secondly, even if a minimum payout set at the mean rate 
would eventually cause underperforming firms to spend down their assets 
(assuming no new contributions), that is the right result. If Congress can 
invest public money in two alternate savings vehicles, one paying 5% and 
the other 10%, why would it want to leave its funds in the firm that can 
only manage a 5% return? To the extent that there is value in perpetual life 
for a particular firm, we’ve seen that this value likely only holds for large 
and venerable organizations, not the small and perhaps neglected 
foundations that largely comprise the group earning sub-median returns.
223
   
In any event, even if there were good policy reasons to protect the 
perpetuity of small underperforming foundations, that would not be a 
reason to set the same minimum payout rate for larger and more successful 
ones. There is no obvious reason Congress must set the same minimum 
payout rate for all foundations. Minimum payout rates could be 
determined by the amount of foundation assets—for instance, by having 
the minimum rate scale up as assets increase—or set individually for each 
firm by using a rolling average of past investment performance.
224
   
2. New Data on Growth in Overall Foundation Assets 
As I argued in Part III, standard finance theory suggests that 
foundations should be willing to spend out of future expected 
contributions as well as present wealth. Therefore, I also examine the 
combined effect of investment returns and new contributions on 
foundation assets. I follow the same methodology as in Part V.C.1, except 
 
 
 222. See supra note 198 and accompanying text. 
 223. See Richard Sansing & Robert Yetman, Governing Private Foundations Using the Tax Law, 
41 J. ACCT. & ECON. 363, 376 (2006) (describing the positive relationship between firm size and 
investment returns); Salamon, The Performance, supra note 205, at 247 (same). 
 224. On the latter point, see Deep & Frumkin, supra note 10, at 20. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss5/5
  
 
 
 
 
2016] PAY IT FORWARD? 1191 
 
 
 
 
that the formula for change in assets does not subtract out new 
contributions. Table 2 summarizes the results.  
TABLE 2: AVERAGE PRIVATE FOUNDATION INVESTMENT RETURNS PLUS 
NEW CONTRIBUTIONS 
 Growth Rate Per Firm, 
Real Dollars 
Nominal Growth Rate Per 
Firm Over Nominal US GDP 
Mean 18.17% 2.72 
Median   8.13% 1.61 
Notes: Reflects period 1985 to 2011. Inflation calculated using historical PCE deflator data from the 
US Bureau of Economic Analysis. Individual firm data are winsorized and weighted by firm mean 
assets. Source: IRS PF-SOI cumulative file.  
As Table 2 shows, the combination of investments and donations 
would allow foundations to grow at more than 18% a year on average. I 
also find that foundation assets grow considerably faster than the 
economy: The median firm grew more than 60% faster than the US 
economy.
225
 
Because I measure only within-foundation changes, these data might 
either over- or understate assets available to the foundation sector as a 
whole, as foundations may close or new foundations may open. Survey 
data from the Foundation Center report that the number of foundations 
grew from 64,000 to 86,000 between 2002 and 2012, and that new gifts to 
foundations have been roughly equal to total foundation grants paid in 
about half the years over that period.
226
 That is, in half of the years in the 
last decade the foundation sector has, on net, not spent any of the 
investment return on its assets.
227
 Foundation Center data show that 
foundations have usually grown by more than 5% annually, net of 
expenditures, implying that there is room for considerably greater 
spending.
228
        
 
 
 225.  I include share of GDP because, as Gene Steuerle argues, “[t]he absolute size of the 
foundation sector may not be so important as its size relative to national wealth.” Steuerle, supra note 
198, at 428. I compare each firm’s growth rate to the growth in GDP over the period we have data for 
that firm. This explains why the ratio for mean GDP ratio is not more than double the ratio for median 
GDP ratio: the GDP growth rate is different for the mean and median firm. 
 226. Foundation Stats, FOUND. CTR., http://data.foundationcenter.org/about.html#quick-start (last 
visited Apr. 19, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/43C8-867G. 
 227. See id. 
 228. Id.; see also PERRY MEHRLING, NAT’L NETWORK OF GRANTMAKERS, SPENDING POLICIES 
FOR FOUNDATIONS: THE CASE FOR INCREASED GRANTS PAYOUT 7 (1999), available at 
https://economics.barnard.edu/sites/default/files/inline/spending_policies.pdf (examining Foundation 
Center data for 1980s and 1990s). 
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Figure 2 illustrates foundation inflows and outflows between 1985 and 
2011. Notably, there was not a single year during this period when real 
total foundation savings declined. 
FIGURE 2: AGGREGATE FOUNDATION REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES, 
1985–2011 
 
Notes: Values summed across all sampled foundations. Dollar values deflated to 2011 dollars using 
the PCE deflator. Source: IRS PF-SOI 2011 Cumulative File. Number of firm-years: 228,407.  
3. Summary and Caveats 
I believe these data make a strong case that, even assuming foundations 
should do nothing but spend an equal amount of money every year in 
perpetuity, the amount the law could demand they spend should be much 
higher than the present 5%. Admittedly, however, there might be some 
offsetting costs to higher spending rates. We do not presently know how 
donors would respond to an increased payout requirement. If donors view 
payout rates as burdensome, they might shift to giving directly to 
operating charities, and it is also possible that overall contributions to 
charity could fall. This effect could be offset if managers are concerned 
about falling asset balances and work harder to bring in new donations. If 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss5/5
  
 
 
 
 
2016] PAY IT FORWARD? 1193 
 
 
 
 
managers dislike high payout rates or fundraising, however, they might 
demand greater compensation. There is some existing evidence that 
managers at faster-paying firms earn a bit more,
229
 and I find a similar 
trend in my data, as detailed in the Appendix. This latter cost is a modest 
portion of foundation resources, however.  
More problematically, if managers view payouts as in effect a tax, they 
might be less willing to exert effort at earning a high return on foundation 
assets. There is some evidence that pre-1981 law, which imposed in effect 
a 100% payout requirement on foundation earnings above 5%, somewhat 
depressed foundation investment performance.
230
 But reforms to increase 
payouts to something like 10% or 15% would be a much less draconian 
burden than 100%, so it is hard to know whether the pre-1981 scenario 
would return under my proposals. More empirical work on these questions 
would be useful going forward.  
D. Section 4940: Federal Tax on Net Investment Earnings 
In addition to requiring a minimum payout of foundation net assets, 
Congress also imposes a small tax on net foundation investment earnings 
(“NIE”).231 Ordinarily, the tax rate is 2%, but an organization can cut that 
to 1% if its annual payout share exceeds its average over the previous five-
year period.
232
 Given this low rate, and the fact that net earnings are only a 
fraction of the value of the foundation’s total investments, the total amount 
of tax is tiny compared to the payout requirement. In my data, the mean 
tax payment is just $35,000, or about one-tenth of 1% of the average 
firm’s investment assets.233    
In theory, a tax on foundation investment income could spur increased 
grant making. Like a carbon tax, the foundation tax would be a 
“Pigouvian” tax, or a penalty on a behavior that has undesirable effects for 
others.
234
 By reducing the payoff to investing, the tax would make 
investing less attractive for managers, relative to other options—in 
 
 
 229. Sansing & Yetman, supra note 223, at 365, also find a significant correlation between payout 
rates and compensation.  
 230. Salamon, The Performance, supra note 205, at 243–44. Salamon notes that overall market 
conditions were also changing during this period, making causation difficult to pin down. Id. 
 231. I.R.C. § 4940 (2014). 
 232. For a cogent summary of the intricacies of the tax, see Yoder & McAllister, supra note 82, at 
49. 
 233. See infra tbl.A.1. 
 234. See GRUBER, supra note 60, at 141–42 (describing Pigouvian taxes). 
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economics lingo, this is the “substitution effect” of the tax.235 So managers 
would be more inclined to spend, although potentially some of that 
spending might be on their own salary and perks rather than grant 
awards.
236
   
But taxes also could affect foundations in other ways. Right now, 
foundations can aggressively switch between investments without 
worrying that sale of the underperforming asset will trigger a tax on the 
appreciated gains.
237
 Making them taxable would undermine this 
advantage. Lower returns on investment could also reduce managers’ 
incentives to put time and resources into asset management, although it 
also could spur fundraising to make up for the lost dollars. And donors, 
knowing that their contributions will earn lower returns overall, might give 
less.
238
 So even if the foundations actually pay little in tax, the behavioral 
side effects of its imposition could reduce the resources available for 
charity. Professor Halperin proposes a tax on total assets, rather than 
earnings, which could eliminate the first problem but likely not the 
others.
239
   
More problematic still, an NIE tax could actually diminish managers’ 
desire to spend. An economist would say that there is an undesirable 
“income effect” that contends with the substitution effect we want to 
produce.
240
 For example, suppose that in order to maintain the foundation 
in perpetuity and protect their jobs, managers prefer to spend only 
investment earnings, and will not spend any money directly out of 
endowment.
241
 By reducing the net earnings of the foundation, the tax 
would reduce the amount these managers would be willing to spend.  
On the other hand, a minimum payout rule, in combination with a 
higher tax, might soften the blow of the income effect. Perhaps the relative 
influence of the income and substitution effects varies across firms. The 
worry would be that the drop in spending due to the income effect at some 
firms would outweigh the substitution-driven increase at others. A 
minimum payout would help to tip the balance towards greater spending, 
 
 
 235. See id. at 36; see Halperin, supra note 30 (proposing this rationale for a tax on investment 
income). 
 236. See Halperin, supra note 26, at 305–06. 
 237. Id. at 309. 
 238. See id. at 301. For evidence, see Heutel & Zeckhauser, supra note 204, at 43. 
 239. Halperin, supra note 30. 
 240. GRUBER, supra note 60, at 36; see also Halperin, supra note 26, at 305. 
 241. One suggestive piece of evidence on this front is that foundations’ shift to higher-return 
investment strategies closely followed the 1981 reduction of mandatory payout rates. Salamon, The 
Process, supra note 86, at 128. 
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by constraining firms that would otherwise be inclined to cut their 
expenditures. But this would certainly not be a perfect solution. 
This might be a situation where carrots, not sticks, offer a better 
solution.
242
 If Congress could offer higher after-tax investment returns to 
foundations that pay out more generously, that would flip some of the 
unwanted side effects of an investment tax. An investment bonus for 
payouts would still create substitution effects in favor of spending, but 
would also realign income effects to point in the right direction.
243
 Since it 
would be, in effect, a matching grant for foundation investments, it might 
also encourage donors to give more, and managers to work harder.  
Current law somewhat approximates this goal, but clumsily. Again, by 
exceeding their 5-year historical average payout, foundations can trim 
their tax from 2% to 1%.
244
 One problem with this approach is that, as 
others note, it sometimes gives firms the wrong incentive, since increased 
payouts in any year will require even higher payouts in the future in order 
to secure the 1% rate.
245
 My colleague Ray Madoff has recently proposed 
a simplified version that eliminates this problem.
246
 More generally, 
though, it is unclear that a 1% carrot is enough of an incentive: the right 
bonus could be 5% or 10%.
247
  
All of this is to say that the optimal rate of tax on foundation 
investments depends on a set of tradeoffs. Since we don’t yet have good 
data on how firms would respond to a significant tax, the correct rate is 
unclear, and might well be negative—that is, the best policy might be a 
subsidy, not a tax at all.  
What we do know is that foundations with living donors behave quite 
differently than firms whose founders are long gone: foundations with 
deceased donors are much more likely to distribute only the statutory 
minimum.
248
 Potentially, the ideal policy would impose different rates of 
tax, or offer different rates of subsidy, depending on these kinds of basic 
firm demographics. For instance, for “old and cold” foundations that are 
 
 
 242. For a more complete discussion of the carrot/stick tradeoff, see Brian Galle, The Tragedy of 
the Carrots: Economics and Politics in the Choice of Price Instruments, 64 STAN. L. REV. 797, 831–
40 (2012). 
 243. Id. at 832. 
 244. See supra note 232 and accompanying text. 
 245. Sansing & Yetman, supra note 223, at 367; Yoder & McAllister, supra note 82, at 46–47. 
 246. Ray D. Madoff, A Better Way to Encourage Charity, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/06/opinion/a-better-way-to-encourage-charity.html?_r=0. 
 247. The 1% cut is a carrot because it enriches firms relative to the existing 2% baseline. Galle, 
supra note 242, at 803–04. 
 248. Salamon, The Performance, supra note 205, at 248–50; Sansing & Yetman, supra note 223, 
at 365; Yoder & McAllister, supra note 82, at 47; see also supra fig.1.  
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unable to attract new donations, and whose spending has been persistently 
bumping along at the statutory minimum, a tax might make more sense 
than a subsidy. The minimum distribution rule already is preventing 
untoward income effects, and bonuses may be unlikely to spur new giving.  
E. Countercyclical Payouts 
In Part IV.B, I argued that restricted spending can be justified to the 
extent that foundations play a role in fighting recessions and disasters. We 
saw empirically that does not actually happen. One likely reason, as others 
have observed, is that current tax law actually discourages recession-
fighting, or “countercyclical,” foundation spending.249 Because the 
minimum payout rule depends on the value of the foundation’s assets in 
the prior tax year, and assets tend to decline in value during economic 
slowdowns, existing law weakens any incentive for firms to spend during 
hard times. Managers’ job security concerns may be especially acute 
during recessions, compounding the problem. As we saw earlier, a similar 
tax flaw is that the incentives for new contributions to philanthropic 
organizations also decline during recessions, due to the diminishing worth 
of the charitable contribution deduction during those periods.
250
 
Prior proposals to fix these problems are too milquetoast. The main 
suggestion, which is sensible, is to calculate the minimum payout floor 
based on a multi-year, rolling average of the firm’s assets, instead of just 
one year at a time.
251
 That way, at the beginning of recessions, the average 
will include some good years as well as the more recent bad ones.
252
 But 
this idea just doesn’t go far enough. Using my sample of foundations, I ran 
simulations in which I calculated how much a 3-year inflation-adjusted 
rolling average would boost spending during recession years.
253
 The 3-
year average raised recession spending by about 11.3%, from a mean of 
$7.6 million to a mean of $8.5 million. Inflation adjustment is important; 
without it, spending increases only 5.5%.  
In any event, rolling averages would also have the unwanted side effect 
of depressing spending in the period just after recessions, since the post-
recession average would be weighed down by the recessionary asset 
 
 
 249. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 112, at 2. 
 250. Steuerle, supra note 198, at 425. 
 251. Salamon, The Performance, supra note 205, at 251; Steuerle, supra note 198, at 426. 
 252. Salamon, The Performance, supra note 205, at 251; Steuerle, supra note 198, at 426. 
 253. For simplicity, I assume that all firms actually meet or exceed their minimum-spending 
threshold.  
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values. State and local budgets usually lag recessions somewhat.
254
 The 
period of greatest fiscal stress for those governments—and therefore the 
time of greatest need for charitable supplements—would be just when 
rolling averages would be pushing down foundation spending. 
It would be more effective, and more consistent with the best rationales 
for restricted spending, to raise the minimum spending floor during 
recessions. For example, a simulation of a temporary 2% increase in the 
payout floor, to 7% during recessions, predicts a 26% increase in recession 
spending.
255
     
To be sure, we should consider carrots for countercyclical spending 
alongside, or instead of, the minimum payout stick. For instance, to make 
up for shortfalls in donations, Congress and state governments could offer 
more generous tax subsidies during times of need, as Congress has 
occasionally done before.
256
   
A more dramatic approach would be to add a bonus deduction, perhaps 
even refundable, for donations that are earmarked for immediate spending 
during recessions. That would accomplish several recession-fighting goals 
at once: it would lower taxes, put more people to work, and provide more 
safety-net spending. It is possible that the bonus would only change the 
timing of some planned gifts, rather than increasing donations overall.
257
 
That, though, would also be socially useful, since the payoff to the 
government’s subsidy dollar is higher during recessions.  
A parallel policy aimed at foundation managers could be to offer bonus 
credit against future § 4942 requirements or § 4940 liability. That is, if a 
foundation spends a dollar above the 5% floor during a recession, it would 
be able to reduce the amount it must distribute after the recession ends by, 
say, $1.20 or $1.50. Again, the effect of this incentive would mostly be to 
shift the timing of foundation spending,
258
 but that is exactly what 
governments should do: they should move public money from flush times 
to hard times. My own view is that this option is hard to defend, since it 
would tend to reduce foundation spending rates overall. I offer it for those 
who disagree with me about the value of restricted spending, but would 
nonetheless like to see foundations act more countercyclically. 
 
 
 254. Rodden & Wibbels, supra note 161, at 57. 
 255. To simplify, I assume the simulated policy would not affect the foundation’s assets except 
through the spending rule.  
 256. See supra note 167 and accompanying text. 
 257. See Bakija, supra note 123, at 573 (suggesting that some donor response to variations in tax 
incentives may be pure re-timing). 
 258. If donors view spending floors as a tax, there might also be increased donations via the 
income effect. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1198 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 93:1143 
 
 
 
 
Finally, foundations could be encouraged to issue more loans or loan 
guarantees. Service organizations report that donations and local 
government contracts dry up during recessions.
259
 As we saw earlier, a 
firm without credit constraints would borrow to smooth revenues over 
these tougher periods, especially given the higher marginal returns to its 
output—that is, the greater social need—during those times. Foundations 
could step in to help service organizations fill this borrowing need.  
Current law already offers very mild incentives in this direction, 
allowing foundations to count below-market loans to service providers 
against their § 4942 limit.
260
 In my sample, though, foundations hardly use 
this option at all; barely one-tenth of 1% of foundation assets is given over 
to these “program-related investments.”261   
More generous treatment—such as offering bonuses against later 
§ 4942 obligations, allowing foundations to earn higher rates of return, or 
booking loan guarantees as current expenditures—might help to stimulate 
more loans. Even a simple informational campaign could help foundations 
to recognize the important role that more aggressive use of loans and 
guarantees could serve.  
All of these policies would work better if they were automatically 
triggered. Timing is crucial for recession-fighting policy.
262
 Waiting for 
Congress to get around to enacting a temporary fix rarely works out 
well,
263
 as our experiences with the 2009 stimulus bill illustrated. A well-
designed statute would trigger whenever economic conditions hit certain 
thresholds, such as employment rates that dipped a substantial amount 
below historical trends.
264
     
F. Closing Donor-Advised-Fund Loopholes 
I mentioned earlier that the last decade has seen a dramatic rise of 
donor-advised funds, an alternative to private foundations. Because of 
their novelty, DAFs remain exempt from many of the rules that govern 
 
 
 259. See generally, e.g., Noah D. Drezner, Recessions and Tax Cuts: Economic Cycles’ Impact on 
Individual Giving, Philanthropy, and Higher Education, 6 INT’L J. EDUC. ADVANCEMENT 289 (2006).  
 260. I.R.C. § 4944(c) (2014); see also David A. Levitt & Robert A. Wexler, Proposed Regulations 
Would Bring Program-Related Investments into the 21st Century, J. TAX’N, Aug. 2012, at 100, 102–
03. 
 261. See infra tbl.A.1. 
 262. See Jeff Strnad, Some Macroeconomic Interactions with Tax Base Choice, 56 SMU L. REV. 
171, 179–81 (2003). 
 263. Christina D. Romer, Changes in Business Cycles: Evidence and Explanations, 13 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 23, 37 (1999). 
 264. See Strnad, supra note 262, at 179–81. 
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private foundations—and indeed, DAF organizers attribute much of the 
institution’s popularity to this freedom.265 In the long run, it will do little 
good to reform the rules of private foundation spending if new donors can 
use DAFs to avoid the new rules.  
Most critically, DAFs are not subject to any minimum payout 
requirement.
266
 Contributors to a qualified DAF can claim a full charitable 
contribution deduction at the date of transfer, even if the fund itself never 
distributes any money.
267
 Furthermore, because the organizations that 
sponsor DAFs are usually treated as public charities for tax purposes, 
donors get an even more generous tax subsidy than is usually available to 
private foundation contributors.
268
   
DAF defenders suggest that no minimum payout rule is needed, 
because they claim that as a descriptive matter, payouts from DAFs have 
been relatively rapid.
269
 This is not necessarily true, and also proves less 
than the defenders think. The IRS does not currently require DAF 
sponsors to report DAF payouts on a fund-by-fund basis.
270
 Therefore, 
sponsors such as Fidelity are able to report aggregate statistics. Judging by 
these aggregates, DAF payout rates are respectable, averaging about 16% 
of the funds under management annually.
271
 But we have no way of 
knowing whether this could represent a few funds that pay out all their 
money, together with many funds that pay little or nothing.
272
 Recent IRS 
data suggest that roughly a quarter of DAF sponsor organizations average 
close to a 0% payout.
273
 Further, because DAFs are so new, we don’t 
know what DAF payout rates will look like when the funds are mature, 
especially after the death of the donor. In the private foundation data, old 
firms, especially those whose original donors have passed on, spend much 
lower shares of their assets than others.
274
   
It might also be argued that DAFs raise fewer concerns about agency 
costs than foundations. In theory, all the spending decisions of the DAF 
 
 
 265. See Marsh, supra note 17, at 147. 
 266. Johnny Rex Buckles, Should the Private Foundation Excise Tax on Failure to Distribute 
Income Generally Apply to “Private Foundation Substitutes”? Evaluating the Taxation of Various 
Models of Charitable Entities, 44 NEW ENG. L. REV. 493, 509 (2010). 
 267. See id. 
 268. Marsh, supra note 17, at 147. 
 269. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON SUPPORTING ORGANIZATIONS AND 
DONOR ADVISED FUNDS 73–74 (2011) (summarizing advocate comments). 
 270. Id. at 5, 50. 
 271. NAT’L PHILANTHROPIC TRUST, 2013 DONOR-ADVISED FUND REPORT 7 (2013). 
 272. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 269, at 59. 
 273. Paul Arnsberger, Donor-Advised Funds: An Overview Using IRS Data, 1 B.C. L. SCH. F. ON 
PHILANTHROPY & THE PUB. GOOD 61, 67 (2015). 
 274. Sansing & Yetman, supra note 223, at 378–79; see also supra fig.1. 
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are made by the contributors, mitigating the problem that managers will 
make decisions the donors wouldn’t. The DAF agency problem is subtler, 
though. DAF sponsors make money by claiming a yearly management fee, 
usually a percentage point or two of the assets in the fund.
275
 The sponsors 
therefore have an incentive to discourage distributions. DAF sponsors 
have been wonderfully innovative in crafting ways to make it easy to get 
money into a DAF, but we haven’t seen similar innovations in tools for 
spending the money.
276
 Neither of these facts is surprising, given the way 
that DAF sponsors are compensated.  
G. State Law 
Finally, the federal government is not the only charity regulator. State 
organizational law provides default rules for the rights and obligations that 
nonprofit stakeholders share. Notably, state law provides background 
principles for how nonprofit managers invest and spend the organization’s 
funds.
277
 In 2006 and the years following, many states undertook dramatic 
revision to their investment rules, as they adopted a model act known as 
the Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act, or 
“UPMIFA.”278   
A little-noticed provision of UPMIFA could have considerable impact 
on foundation spending. UPMIFA’s drafters included an optional 
provision (modeled on a longstanding Massachusetts rule) allowing 
adopting states to create a soft cap on endowment spending for corporate 
charities (but not, for the most part, charitable trusts).
279
 The cap states that 
annual spending in excess of 7% of a firm’s investment assets would be 
presumptively a violation of the manager’s duty to the organization, 
although the presumption is rebuttable.
280
 Fifteen states have adopted 
some version of the cap, although Ohio’s differs from all the others.281    
 
 
 275. Marsh, supra note 17, at 147, 178. 
 276. See id. at 175–76 (describing bare-bones donation forms employed by DAFs); U.S. DEP’T OF 
THE TREASURY, supra note 269, at 50 (noting evidence of low advisory effort by national DAF 
sponsors). 
 277. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 47, at 304–06. 
 278. Gary, supra note 25, at 1288–89. 
 279. See UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 4(d) (2006). 
 280. Id. 
 281. CAL. PROB. CODE § 18504(d) (West 2015); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 13, § 5104(7) (2015); MD. 
CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 15-403(d) (West 2015); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 180A, § 2 (2015); 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-30-209(4) (2015); NEV. REV. STAT. § 164.667(4) (2015); N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 292–B:4(VI) (2015); N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 553(d) (McKinney 2015); N.D. 
CENT. CODE § 59-21-03(4) (2015); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1715.53(D) (West 2015); OR. REV. STAT. 
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My empirical analysis shows that the cap has had an impact on 
foundation spending. Table 3 reports the results of a regression analysis 
comparing firms in UPMIFA-adopting states before and after the adoption 
of the spending cap. I first examine the effect of changes in law within 
firms over time, comparing firms where the cap took effect against other 
firms in the same state that are not governed by UPMIFA—a so-called 
“difference in differences” analysis. The imposition of a cap seems to 
reduce average spending in newly capped firms by about 8% and reduces 
the likelihood that the firm will exceed the federal floor by 7%. In another 
analysis, detailed in the Appendix, I also find that, comparing firms 
subject to a cap to similar firms in uncapped states, capped firms are 30% 
less likely to exceed the 5% federal spending floor. 
TABLE 3: EFFECT OF DEFAULT SPENDING CAP ON FOUNDATION 
EXPENDITURES 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Does Firm Pay Over Five 
Percent Floor? 
Log of Grants 
Awarded 
   
Year subject to cap -0.0710*** -0.0836*** 
 (-4.971) (-5.938) 
Log officer comp. 0.0611*** 0.0949*** 
 (3.348) (3.356) 
R-squared 0.096 0.037 
   
Notes: Coefficients reported with (z-score). Regressions include controls for foundation net assets, 
donations received, officer compensation, income, and negative income; state expenditures, 
population, and share of population under 26 and over 64; and state, firm, and calendar-year fixed 
effects. Number of firms: 7,477. ***: statistically significant at the 1% level. 
There is no obvious policy justification for the spending cap, and it is 
reducing the money available for current charitable needs.
282
 The policy 
recommendation here is simple. States should repeal their caps. Further, 
some states have adopted tax incentives to lure restricted-spending 
 
 
§ 128.322(4) (2015); TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-10-204(d) (2015); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 163.005(d) 
(West 2015); UTAH CODE ANN. § 51-8-304 (West 2015); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-7-304(d) (2015). 
 Ohio sets the cap at 5% and flips the presumption, stating that spending under 5% is 
presumptively prudent. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1715.53(D). 
 282. UPMIFA’s drafters included the cap provision out of “[c]oncern that charities would be 
tempted to spend endowment assets too rapidly.” Gary, supra note 25, at 1314. 
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vehicles away from other states.
283
 Others should resist this kind of 
destructive race to the bottom, and federal rules disfavoring restricted 
spending might help in that direction.  
CONCLUSION 
Choosing exactly the right regulations for restricted-spending charities 
won’t necessarily be easy or obvious, but we probably know enough today 
to take some first steps. The arguments in favor of subsidizing charitable 
gifts subject to restricted spending are surprisingly thin. Future 
philanthropy is often predictably of lower value than charity today. To the 
extent that waiting has value, that goal can be met through policies other 
than perpetually restricted spending: Organizations can raise new money, 
and government policy can encourage organizations to set aside money 
temporarily to distribute in a later crisis.  
The real question, then, is how best to reconcile the unappealing nature 
of restricted spending with the welter of current laws that support and 
encourage it. To be sure, any policy change could have unwanted side 
effects. If we demand that donors allow their gifts to be spent more 
quickly, there is some potential that donors or managers could change 
their behaviors in response. But there is no evidence right now to suggest 
that this effect would be a major factor. There is, on the other hand, 
considerable evidence—including new data I have reported here—that 
foundations could continue indefinitely even under much higher rates of 
spending than the law now requires. Further, there seem to be no worries 
about side effects from revoking several of the more egregious, and 
unjustified, rules propping up restricted spending, such as the non-
regulation of donor-advised funds and state laws that seem to have no 
purpose other than a race to the bottom to entice foundation-lawyering 
business from state to state.  
In sum, while caution is appropriate, this is an area where some of the 
fruit are hanging low indeed. Policy makers should consider some first 
steps now, and researchers can study whether these steps give any 
indication that more dramatic action to curb restricted spending would 
have unwanted impacts.  
 
 
 283. Irvin, supra note 10, at 454. 
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APPENDIX 
The foundation data used throughout this Article are derived from the 
2011 Cumulative PF-SOI data file compiled by the National Center on 
Charitable Statistics (“NCCS”). NCCS collates data from individual Form 
990 tax returns filed by each foundation and then machine-scanned by the 
IRS. The Cumulative file includes tax returns for fiscal years spanning 
1985 through 2011. Not all organizations are included in the PF-SOI data; 
instead, the data are a stratified sample, with overweighting of the largest 
firms. Unless otherwise noted, I use sample weighting to recover the 
population distribution.  
Except where noted, I deflate nominal values to real dollar amounts 
using the PCE index calculated by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Table A.1 provides a statistical overview of the data; data reported in this 
table are not winsorized but are sample weighted.  
TABLE A.1: SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Variable Mean SD Min Max 
Donations 386773 1.66E+07 0 1.40E+10 
Fundraising 498220.9 9426910 0 3.77E+09 
Assets 6170387 1.31E+08 0 3.91E+10 
Taxable Trust? 0.000345 0.018572 0 1 
Operating Foundation? 0.080528 0.27211 0 1 
§ 4942 Expends 477772.4 9200223 0 3.77E+09 
Other Income 33831.49 1271622 -3.54E+08 4.14E+08 
Total Income 848706.7 2.10E+07 -4.63E+08 1.39E+10 
Officer Comp. 10850.59 81551.72 0 9371595 
Grants Paid 415127.2 1.05E+07 0 4.16E+09 
All Expends 534889.7 1.17E+07 0 4.72E+09 
Liabilities 233251.6 1.49E+07 0 1.29E+10 
Payout / Inv. Assets 1.575511 69.13112 0 18773.4 
Net Investment Assets 5532168 1.22E+08 0 3.55E+10 
UPMIFA in Effect 0.169227 0.374953 0 1 
Prog. Related Inv. ($) 34342 821275 0 1.68E+08 
Notes: Number of Observations: 228,407. All dollar figures deflated to 2009 dollars using the PCE 
deflator. 
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Foundation Returns on Investment 
 
Part V.C.1 describes the historical rate of return on foundation 
investments. For the most part, I replicate the methodology of Cambridge 
Associates, Inc. (“CAI”), which has prepared a series of prior reports, but I 
use my full sample of thousands of foundations, rather than CAI’s four 
dozen. I omit private operating foundations and nonexempt charitable 
trusts. 
To calculate the average compounded rate of return, I follow the 
method for imputing investment returns provided in the 2000 CAI report 
Appendix D. That is, the imputed annual rate of return, before inflation, is: 
(net investment assetst - net investment assetst-1 + expenditurest + 
taxes paidt - new contributionst) / net investment assetst-1 
where the subscripts t and t-1 indicate that values are for the current fiscal 
year and the antecedent year, respectively.
284
 In order to translate these 
figures into a compounded rate of return, I link the individual annual 
observations in a geometric sequence and compute an annual rate of return 
using the standard compound growth rate formula.  
As typically occurs with large financial databases, the resulting values 
include some extreme outliers. A standard research practice in this context 
is to “winsorize” the data, which is to drop observations falling in the 
highest and lowest percentile of results.
285
 Hand examination of samples of 
the dropped observations suggests that many seem to have been carelessly 
reported or inaccurately scanned, with implausible values for key inputs 
into the formula.
286
 Again, following the methodology of the CAI report, I 
also weight the results by firm assets.  
I calculate real rates of return using three measures of inflation. The US 
government uses different measures of inflation for different purposes. 
 
 
 284. The CAI study is unclear on whether it uses current- or antecedent-year-values for 
expenditures, taxes, and new contributions. Logically, since the value we are reconstructing is the 
change in asset values between the end of year 0 and the end of year 1, these should be year 1 values.  
 Both expenditures and taxes paid are included in the equation because the instructions for the 
“total expenditures” field on the Form 990 direct the firm to exclude the amount of taxes paid when 
calculating the “total.” 
 285. Dhiren Ghosh & Andrew Vogt, Outliers: An Evaluation of Methodologies, 1 AM. 
STATISTICAL ASS’N SECTION ON SURVEY METHODS—JOINT STATISTICAL MEETING 2012, at 3455, 
3456 (2012). 
 286. For example, NCCS attempts to flag and correct returns for which some values are reported 
in dollars and others in thousands of dollars, but they do not claim, and likely could not realistically 
achieve, complete success in that effort.  
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Three of the major measures are CPI, PCE, and the GDP deflator.
287
 Each 
measure varies somewhat from the others in which goods are included in 
the “basket” whose price is observed, the method of estimating consumer 
responses, and similar technical details.
288
 CPI itself has two variants, 
standard and “chained” CPI.289 Chained CPI and PCE each assume that, as 
prices rise, consumers will switch to cheaper alternatives, while standard 
CPI assumes (probably unrealistically) a fixed basket of goods.
290
 PCE is 
probably the best measure of the inflation rate facing foundations, since it 
is chained and its basket explicitly is modeled to include items commonly 
purchased by service-providing nonprofits, while CPI tracks only goods 
bought by consumers.
291
 
In any event, I calculate real rates of return separately for CPI, PCE, 
and GDP deflator. I allow each firm to face an individualized inflation rate 
by comparing monthly inflation rates for the last month of the firm’s fiscal 
year in the first year the firm appears in the SOI file against the monthly 
CPI-U for the last month the firm appears.
292
   
 
Recessionary Spending Simulation 
 
Part V.D reports the simulated effect on recessionary spending of a 
policy in which firms use an inflation-adjusted 3-year average of their 
minimum payout floor. Recession dates are derived from NBER 
determinations.
293
 I code a year as recessionary if the economy was 
contracting for more than one month of that year.
294
 To run the simulation, 
I assume that any firm that met its minimum payout rate in reality would 
also meet any increased payout triggered by the use of a 3-year average; 
 
 
 287. Clinton P. McCully et al., Comparing the Consumer Price Index and the Personal 
Consumption Expenditures Price Index, SURVEY OF CURRENT BUS., Nov. 2007, at 26, 26; What Is an 
Implicit Price Deflator and Where Can I Find the GNP IPD?, U.S. BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, 
http://www.bea.gov/faq/index.cfm?faq_id=513 (last updated Mar. 19, 2009), archived at 
https://perma.cc/3CWH-JNFC. 
 288. See McCully et al., supra note 287, at 28–30. 
 289. Sean Sullivan, The Ins and Outs of ‘Chained CPI’ Explained, WASH. POST (Apr. 10, 2013), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2013/04/10/the-ins-and-outs-of-chained-cpi-explain 
ed/. 
 290. See McCully et al., supra note 287, at 28. 
 291. See id. at 29. 
 292. Because historical GDP deflator data are only available quarterly, I use the quarter closest to 
the close of the firm’s fiscal year in place of the actual month.  
 293. US Business Cycle Expansions and Contractions, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RES., 
http://www.nber.org/cycles.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/85F2-
M7MB. 
 294. I therefore code 2007 as non-recessionary, since the economy was contracting only in 
December of that year.  
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this assumption may slightly overstate the real impact of a higher floor. 
For simplicity, I assume that changing the floor does not affect firms 
whose spending exceeded the simulated floor amount or those that missed 
their real minimum.  
After winsorizing and weighting by firm mean assets, I find that mean 
spending during recessions was $7.63 million, while simulated spending 
using the 3-year average would rise to $8.49 million, an increase of 
11.3%. If averaging is done with nominal rather than inflation-adjusted 
floor amounts, spending would increase only 5.5%. In contrast, a 
simulation of a 7% floor increases mean recession spending to $9.62 
million, a 26.1% increase. 
 
Effect of Default Spending Caps 
 
Part V.G describes the results of regression analyses in which I 
examine the impact of a state law default presumption of imprudence for 
firms spending in excess of 7% of their net investment assets. To control 
for the effects of other reforms that might affect spending, I limit the 
analysis to states that enact UPMIFA, a 2006 model act adopted by forty-
six states between 2006 and 2011. UPMIFA includes an optional provision 
imposing the 7% cap, and thirteen states either adopt the model provision 
or already had one in place as of the date UPMIFA went into effect. Data 
on UPMIFA adoption date and cap adoption were hand collected and 
coded. Because Ohio’s cap rule is dissimilar from all other states, I omit 
Ohio from the analysis. My results aren’t meaningfully affected by 
dropping Ohio. 
I estimate the impact of the cap three different ways. The first two 
employ fixed-effects panel regressions, with the dependent variable either 
logged grants awarded or the share of firms distributing qualifying funds 
in excess of their federal 5% floor. In both cases, I use a difference-in-
differences identification strategy. UPMIFA governs the behavior of 
nonprofits organized as corporations, but not those organized as trusts. 
The reported coefficient measures the interaction effect of dummy 
variables for corporate status and post-cap-enactment time period, as in 
equation 2, below: 
𝑆𝑖𝑡 = α + 𝛽1𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑖 + 𝛿𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑗𝑡 *𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑖  + 𝛽3𝑋𝑖𝑡 + λt + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜑𝑗 + εit  (2) 
where delta is the coefficient of interest, the interaction term between cap 
enactment and the “treated” population; j and i index states and firms, 
respectively; and X is a vector of firm-level controls. To account for 
endogenous choice of form, the Corp variable is defined as the firm’s 
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organizational form in the year prior to treatment. Since by construction 
Corp does not vary within firm, it is dropped in the actual regression.  
Because the treatment effect varies only at the state level, I cluster 
standard errors by state.  
To capture some sense of the cross-sectional variation, the third 
approach uses a pooled probit model, again identifying off the difference 
in differences. I then estimate the marginal effect of the cap provision at 
sample means using the margins command in Stata 13. As reported in the 
main text, using this approach suggests that the existence of a cap reduces 
by about 28% the likelihood that the mean firm will exceed the federal 
spending floor, with 95% confidence interval, from 24.18% to 32.34%. I 
note, though, that pooled regressions of this kind can sometimes be biased 
upwards.   
Complete regression results are available from the author on request. I 
also find the expected coefficients on the control variables, as well as that 
increased spending is correlated with greater executive compensation. One 
dollar in additional grants is correlated with about ten cents in added 
executive salary.  
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